Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 7 2012
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659081.003.0010
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Presentism and Distributional Properties*

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Cited by 27 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…Note, too, that this need not entail the fixity of the future. See Cameron We're sceptical of Cameron's claim that hyper-change is involved in the change that Tallant & Ingram (2012a) describe, from: (A) the rose is red and then the rose is dead, to: (B*) the rose is green (not red) and then the rose is dead. We simply don't see how hyper-time is required to make plausible this change.…”
Section: Explaining the Illusionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Note, too, that this need not entail the fixity of the future. See Cameron We're sceptical of Cameron's claim that hyper-change is involved in the change that Tallant & Ingram (2012a) describe, from: (A) the rose is red and then the rose is dead, to: (B*) the rose is green (not red) and then the rose is dead. We simply don't see how hyper-time is required to make plausible this change.…”
Section: Explaining the Illusionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hence, the union of the TDP and the age property serve to make true <Ross was a boy>, and so we have a solution to the truth-maker problem. 10 In response to this new hope for presentists, Tallant & Ingram (2012a) point to a problem that we shall rehearse here only very briefly. Tallant & Ingram argue that it's possible an object instantiating a TDP change over time, such that it instantiates different TDPs at different times, and they further argue that this generates a problem for Cameron.…”
mentioning
confidence: 97%
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