Ostrich presentism

Torrengo, Giuliano

doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0211-x

Cited by 29 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…For arguments in favour of the B-theoretic outlook see e.g. Oaklander and White 2007;Le Poidevin 2007Mellor 1998;Prosser , 2013Prosser , 2016Price 1996Price , 2011Rasmussen 2012;Mozersky 2001Mozersky , 2013Mozersky , 2015Torrengo 2014Torrengo , 2017aTorrengo , 2017bTorrengo , 2018. It is not my intention here to give justice to all extant theories within the A and B orientations.…”

Section: Real Time and The Concept Of Timementioning

confidence: 98%

“…At this point, in order to continue with the hypothesis of the E > M reduction, we have to descend to the level of modality and pursue it on that lower level, namely through the parallelism of the vertical reductions in the L, E, and, as is to be demonstrated, the M domains. 23 A further supporting argument comes from the denial of presentism: arguably, the present E , the past E and the future E are intuitively equally real, and so eternalism is intuitively plausible (see Torrengo 2014Torrengo , 2017b. 24 To repeat, I sketch an account of the subjective feeling of the rate of passage in a separate paper, pointing out the importance of the awareness of its subjectivity.…”

Section: Correlating Time E and Time Mmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Human Imprints of Real Time: from Semantics to Metaphysics

Jaszczolt

2020

Philosophia

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Investigation into the reality of time can be pursued within the ontological domain or it can also span human thought and natural language. I propose to approach time by correlating three domains of inquiry: metaphysical time (M), the human concept of time (E), and temporal reference in natural language (L), entertaining the possibility of what I call a 'horizontal reduction' (L > E > M) and 'vertical reduction'. I present a view of temporality L/E as epistemic modality, drawing on evidence from the L domain and its correlates in the E and M domains. On this view, the human concept of time is a complex, 'molecular' concept and can be broken down into primitive concepts that are modal in nature, featuring as degrees of epistemic commitment to representations of states of affairs. I present evidence from tensed and tenseless languages (endorsing the L > E path) and point out its compatibility with the view of real time as metaphysical modality (endorsing the E > M path). Keywords Metaphysical time. Real time. Human concept of time. Time in language. Temporal reference. Reductionism. Modal reduction. Default Semantics. Tenseless languages Abbreviations time M Real time/metaphysical time time E Human concept of time time L Time in language 1 The Questions 'Yes, I love life. Why?' 'But you've made up your mind to shoot yourself.' Philosophia

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Section: Real Time and The Concept Of Timementioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Correlating Time E and Time Mmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human Imprints of Real Time: from Semantics to Metaphysics

Jaszczolt

2020

Philosophia

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“…This can be seen as a specific instance of the problem of truths containing empty names. For discussion of the temporal version of this problem, seeSider (1999).2 For discussion, see, among others,Bigelow (1996),Lewis (2001),Sider (2001, 35-42),Armstrong (2004: 145-50),Keller (2004),Tallant (2009),Markosian (2013),Torrengo (2014),Baron (2015) andTallant and Ingram (2015). Note that, unlike the Problem of Truth, the Problem of Truthmaking arises also for propositions that do not involve direct reference to individuals that are not present-for example, the proposition that there was an emperor of Rome.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…8 Cf. the claim that the appeasing approach constitutes a 'cheating'(Tallant, 2009), 'ostrich'(Torrengo, 2014) or otherwise 'nefarious'(Tallant & Ingram, 2015) response to the Problem of Truthmaking.9 The hypothetical/categorical distinction isSider's (2001, 41), though he draws it at the level of properties. Our suggestion that hypothetical facts stand in need of metaphysical explanation is consonant with Sider's own complaints against treating hypothetical properties as 'primitive'.10 Orthodoxy has it that grounding is irreflexive.…”

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confidence: 99%

Cross‐temporal grounding

Correia

Merlo

2023

Philosophical Books

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Cross‐temporal grounding is a type of grounding whereby present facts about the past (for example that Caesar was alive) are explained in terms of past facts (for example that Caesar is alive) rather than in terms of other present facts. This paper lays the foundations for a theory of cross‐temporal grounding. After introducing the general idea of a type of grounding connecting facts to past facts, we offer two arguments that past‐directed facts require cross‐temporal grounds—the ‘argument from intimacy’ and the ‘argument from past explanation’. We then go on to show that cross‐temporal grounding statements can be understood as instances of a type of explanation which is perfectly legitimate and intelligible, even if somewhat unusual. Finally, we explain how the logic of grounding can be extended to accommodate cross‐temporal grounding statements.

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God Knows the True Future: Ockhamism

Florio

Frigerio

2019

Divine Omniscience and Human Free Will

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Ostrich presentism

Cited by 29 publications

References 48 publications

Human Imprints of Real Time: from Semantics to Metaphysics

Human Imprints of Real Time: from Semantics to Metaphysics

Cross‐temporal grounding

God Knows the True Future: Ockhamism

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