The Volitional Self-Contradiction Interpretation of Kant’s Formula of Universal Law: A Response to Kleingeld

Abstract

In this paper I critically engage with Pauline Kleingeld’s ‘volitional self-contradiction’ interpretation of Kant’s formula of universal law. I make three remarks: first, I seek to clarify what it means for a contradiction to be volitional as opposed to logical; second, I suggest that her interpretation might need to be closer to Korsgaard’s ‘practical contradiction’ interpretation than she thinks; and third, I suggest that more work needs to be done to explain how a volitional self-contradiction generates both a ‘contradiction in conception’ and a ‘contradiction in will.’

A Defense and Development of the Volitional Self-Contradiction Interpretation

“…Therefore, he cannot will to act on the maxim himself and simultaneously will that it become a universal law. Walschots (2023), Timmons (2023), Romero (2023), andLo Re (2023) do not contest that it is textually possible to construct the maxim as I do; nor do they challenge my claim that this would yield a volitional self-contradiction. They find it textually more plausible, however, to split Kant's description of the agent's attitudes into two parts.…”

“…This is rightly emphasized byRomero (2023) and elaborated byWalschots (2023).7 In the passages cited here, Kant clearly relies on a conception of rationality. Thus, I would give a positive answer to Romero's question whether I would accept the idea that the FUL presupposes a conception of rationality.…”

“…The quoted passage raises the question of how the 'contradiction in conception' relates to the volitional self-contradiction that I call the 'relevant' contradiction. It seems to several critics that the really 'relevant' contradiction is the 'contradiction in conception' and that the problem Kant diagnoses for the first set of maxims is the inconceivability or 'inner impossibility' of their becoming universal laws, rather than the fact that they cannot simultaneously be willed to become such (Walschots, 2023, Lo Re, 2023. Relatedly, others object that invoking a volitional self-contradiction here is superfluous (Timmons, 2023, following Kahn, 2019.…”

“…I appreciate the textual point that we should expect Kant's explanation of the fourth example to match his explanation of the third. The VSCI will indeed gain 'interpretive force' (Walschots, 2023) if it can analyze his third and fourth examples in parallel fashion and solve the problem concerning the short maxim of never helping. Before I show how the challenge can be met, important clarifications are in order about Kant's argument leading up to the FUL.…”