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The term “cosmopolitan” derives from the Greek word for “citizen of the world.” The word has a wide range of uses, both outside of philosophy and within it. Within philosophical contexts, it has a less technical and a more specific sense. In the less technical sense, a cosmopolitan is someone who is impartial or open‐minded, a person who is well traveled, or a person who feels at home in a multicultural environment or simply anywhere. In the more specific sense, a cosmopolitan is a defender of cosmopolitanism, which is a family of theories that affirm some conception of world citizenship. This description of cosmopolitanism is not very informative because it does not specify any particular theoretical commitments that all forms of cosmopolitanism share. A more contentful definition is impossible, however, because beyond the formal description there is not a single essential element of the position that all recognizably cosmopolitan positions have in common. Depending on the area of human activity (morality, politics, culture, etc.) and the conception of citizenship involved (egalitarian or not) ( see Citizenship), and depending on whether “world citizenship” is taken literally or metaphorically , cosmopolitanism takes on very different forms. In current moral and political theory, “cosmopolitanism” often refers to the thesis that human beings are equal ( see Egalitarianism), combined with the idea that a theory of global justice should address the needs and interests of human individuals directly – as citizens of the world – instead of indirectly, via their membership in states. But some Stoic and neo‐Stoic cosmopolitans were not egalitarians in this sense. Moreover, the term is also regularly used for very different views, such as a particular conception of a modern form of cultural identity, or a theory about the proper relations among the states in the world (see below). Cosmopolitanism is therefore best considered as a family of positions, centered on the notion of world citizenship, either in a literal sense (political cosmopolitanism) or in a metaphorical sense (moral or cultural cosmopolitanism).

In debates over the conditions for a just world order, one hears frequent appeals to Kant's call for states to unite in a federation. Given the force of Kant's arguments and their influence on the shape of such institutions as the League of Nations and the United Nations, this is certainly justified. But an essential part of what Kant saw as necessary for a global legal order is usually neglected. What is overlooked is Kant's emphasis on the status of individuals under what he calls ‘cosmopolitan law’. Cosmopolitan law is concerned not with the interaction between states, but with the status of individuals in their dealings with states of which they are not citizens. Moreover, it is concerned with the status of individuals as human beings, rather than as citizens of states. In Kant's political theory, cosmopolitan law (Weltbürgerrecht) is the third category of public law, in addition to constitutional law and international law. Its core is what Kant calls a right to hospitality. He argues that states and individuals have the right to attempt to establish relations with other states and their citizens, but not a right to enter foreign territory. States have the right to refuse visitors, but not violently, and not if it leads to their destruction. This implies an obligation to refrain from imperialist intrusions and to provide safe haven for refugees.

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In part as a response to the current resurgence of nationalist sentiment in many parts of the world, several authors have recently sought to revive the legacy of cosmopolitanism. ' They frequently appeal to eighteenth-century cosmopolitans, especially Immanuel Kant, and to their notions of the moral equality of all human beings, the existence of a set of human rights, and the urgency of establishing the political institution of a league of nations. But the full complexity of eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism has not yet been explored. Defenders and critics of cosmopolitanism agree that it is a form of universalism. It is the view that all human beings share certain essential features that unite or should unite them in a global order that transcends national borders and warrants their designation as "citizens of the world." But few scholars have examined the precise content of the various cosmopolitan theories of the time to determine just what these features are and what form this global order takes. While typologies and histories of nationalism abound, cosmopolitanism has so far remained largely unexplored territory.2 At most, one finds a distinction drawn between moral 1 Martha Nussbaum defends a moral version of cosmopolitanism in her "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,"

Kant's most prominent formulation of the Categorical Imperative, known as the Formula of Universal Law (FUL), is generally thought to demand that one act only on maxims that one can will as universal laws without this generating a contradiction. Kant's view is standardly summarized as requiring the 'universalizability' of one's maxims and described in terms of the distinction between 'contradictions in conception' and 'contradictions in the will'. Focusing on the underappreciated significance of the simultaneity condition included in the FUL, I argue, by contrast, that the principle is better read as requiring that one be able to will two things simultaneously without self-contradiction, namely, that a maxim be one's own and that it be a universal law. This amounts to a new interpretation of the FUL with significant interpretive and philosophical advantages.

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In part as a response to the current resurgence of nationalist sentiment in many parts of the world, several authors have recently sought to revive the legacy of cosmopolitanism. ' They frequently appeal to eighteenth-century cosmopolitans, especially Immanuel Kant, and to their notions of the moral equality of all human beings, the existence of a set of human rights, and the urgency of establishing the political institution of a league of nations. But the full complexity of eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism has not yet been explored. Defenders and critics of cosmopolitanism agree that it is a form of universalism. It is the view that all human beings share certain essential features that unite or should unite them in a global order that transcends national borders and warrants their designation as "citizens of the world." But few scholars have examined the precise content of the various cosmopolitan theories of the time to determine just what these features are and what form this global order takes. While typologies and histories of nationalism abound, cosmopolitanism has so far remained largely unexplored territory.2 At most, one finds a distinction drawn between moral 1 Martha Nussbaum defends a moral version of cosmopolitanism in her "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,"