Making Sense of Kant’s Formula of Universal Law: On Kleingeld’s Volitional Self-Contradiction Interpretation

Timmons, Mark

doi:10.1007/s11406-023-00615-2

Cited by 2 publications

(10 citation statements)

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“…Therefore, he cannot will to act on the maxim himself and simultaneously will that it become a universal law. Walschots (2023), Timmons (2023), Romero (2023), andLo Re (2023) do not contest that it is textually possible to construct the maxim as I do; nor do they challenge my claim that this would yield a volitional self-contradiction. They find it textually more plausible, however, to split Kant's description of the agent's attitudes into two parts.…”

Section: Kant's Third and Fourth Examples: The Problemmentioning

confidence: 70%

“…It seems to several critics that the really 'relevant' contradiction is the 'contradiction in conception' and that the problem Kant diagnoses for the first set of maxims is the inconceivability or 'inner impossibility' of their becoming universal laws, rather than the fact that they cannot simultaneously be willed to become such (Walschots, 2023, Lo Re, 2023. Relatedly, others object that invoking a volitional self-contradiction here is superfluous (Timmons, 2023, following Kahn, 2019. After all, showing that a maxim fails the 'contradiction in conception' test suffices for establishing its impermissibility.…”

Section: Contradictions In Conception and Volitional Self-contradictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…He locates the relevant contradiction within willing the world of the universalized maxim, by virtue of there being a contradiction 'in the hypothetical world being contemplated' (Timmons, 2023, original emphasis). As for the first set of maxims that fail the FUL test, Timmons relies on the notion of a system of causal laws for showing how this contradiction is generated: it is a 'logical contradiction that results from trying to conceive of one's maxim as a universal law of nature' (Timmons, 2023). If it is impossible to act on the maxim when it is a law of nature, then in willing that the maxim become a universal law one would be willing (or attempting to will) two mutually contradictory states of affairs in one volition: a world in which people act on the maxim and a world in which people do not.…”

Section: The Logical Contradiction Interpretationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the case of the second set of maxims that fail the test, Timmons again sees the relevant contradiction as obtaining in the idea of the world in which the tested maxim is a universal law, but constructing this idea now requires a further step. He argues that 'one is to import into that hypothetical world the information about the commitments of rational agency' (Timmons, 2023). If a maxim's becoming a universal law is inconsistent with the rational commitments of agents in that world (as, for example, in the case of the maxim of never helping), then the idea of this hypothetical world contains a contradiction.…”

Section: The Logical Contradiction Interpretationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As a result, willing that such a maxim become a universal law contains a contradiction. Again, the logical contradiction resides 'in the hypothetical world being contemplated' (Timmons, 2023).…”

Section: The Logical Contradiction Interpretationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Defense and Development of the Volitional Self-Contradiction Interpretation

Kleingeld

2023

Philosophia

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Kant’s Formula of Universal Law (FUL) is generally believed to require you to act only on the basis of maxims that you can will without contradiction to become universal laws. In “Contradiction and Kant’s Formula of Universal Law” (2017), I have proposed to read the FUL instead as requiring that, for any maxim on which you act, you can will two things simultaneously, without volitional self-contradiction: (1) willing the maxim as your own action principle and (2) willing that it become a universal law. In the present essay, I reply to comments by Mark Timmons, Michael Walschots, Paola Romero, and Stefano Lo Re. In response to their comments concerning the application of the FUL, I expand the interpretive framework of the Volitional Self-Contradiction Interpretation. I argue that Kant also constructs the diagnostic volitional self-contradiction as a contradiction between (1) willing a tested maxim to become a universal law and (2) willing what humans, qua finite rational beings, necessarily will, namely the means to their actual and possible future ends. I also clarify how the two ways in which Kant specifies the test are related. Furthermore, I clarify the relation between the Volitional Self-Contradiction interpretation and other interpretations of the FUL, in particular the ‘Practical Contradiction’ and ‘Logical Contradiction’ interpretations, as well as its difference from the Golden Rule. I also address the objection that the volitional self-contradiction is superfluous, clarify the relation between the Formula of Universal Law and the Formula of the Law of Nature, and explain why the will of an immoral agent does not contain a volitional self-contradiction of the type at issue.

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