The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding

Abstract

Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is. Often missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, namely that knowledge is always more valuable than the value of its subparts. Taking Platos' Meno as a starting point of his discussion, Kvanvig tackles the different arguments about the value of knowledge and comes to the conclusion that knowledge is less valuable than generally assumed. Clearly written and well argued, this 2003 book will appeal to students and professionals in epistemology.

Is Understanding A Species Of Knowledge?

“…And, again, there is no reason to think that we have any kind of transparent access to whether or not such dependencies actually obtain. 5 2 Kvanvig's account Kvanvig's ([2003]) account of understanding is therefore an improvement on Zagzebski's, in this respect at least, because he insists on the factive character of understanding. For Kvanvig, what this means is that in order for a mental state to count as a state of understanding, the beliefs that constitute the state must be true.…”

“…But that understanding is a kind of knowledge is something that-so far at least-has rarely been doubted by those working in the field. 2 That makes it all the more striking that virtually every major epistemologist who has thought seriously about the nature of understanding-including Catherine Elgin ([1996], [2004]), Linda Zagzebski ([2001]), and Jonathan Kvanvig ([2003])-has come to the conclusion that understanding is not a species of knowledge. 3 They variously claim, for example, that understanding is immune to Gettier problems whereas knowledge is not, that understanding is transparent whereas knowledge is not, and that understanding is possible even in the absence of truth, whereas this is an impossibility for knowledge.…”

Against swamping

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Abstract:The Swamping Argument -highlighted by Kvanvig (2003;2010) -purports to show that the epistemic value of truth will always swamp the epistemic value of any non-factive epistemic properties (e.g. justification) so that these properties can never add any epistemic value to an already-true belief.

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“…This is Kvanvig's (2003) ultimate assessment (even though it is specifically a reliabilist theory of knowledge that he has most often cited as an example of a theory that succumbs to the Swamping Problem). 6 Alternatively, one might reject Kvanvig's revisionist position and take versions of the Swamping Argument as a sort of challenge: a challenge to demonstrate how, on one's own theory of knowledge, the conclusion can be avoided.…”

“…6 Alternatively, one might reject Kvanvig's revisionist position and take versions of the Swamping Argument as a sort of challenge: a challenge to demonstrate how, on one's own theory of knowledge, the conclusion can be avoided. 7 Surprisingly, the Swamping Thesis itself appears to have gone almost entirely unchallenged. We think that this is a mistake.…”