2006
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axl015
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Is Understanding A Species Of Knowledge?

Abstract: Among philosophers of science there seems to be a general consensus that understanding represents a species of knowledge, but virtually every major epistemologist who has thought seriously about understanding has come to deny this claim. Against this prevailing tide in epistemology, I argue that understanding is, in fact, a species of knowledge: just like knowledge, for example, understanding is not transparent and can be Gettiered. I then consider how the psychological act of ''grasping'' that seems to be cha… Show more

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Cited by 285 publications
(217 citation statements)
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References 14 publications
(7 reference statements)
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“…According to explanationists, understanding is in essence knowledge of correct explanations (Hempel 1965;Salmon 1984;Khalifa 2012Khalifa , 2013. Manipulationists, on the other hand, claim that understanding is essentially a specific kind of ability, roughly, an ability to perform (certain kinds of) manipulations of (certain kinds of) representations of the phenomena understood (de Regt and Dieks 2005;de Regt 2009a, b;Grimm 2006Grimm , 2014Wilkenfeld 2013. 4 In a recent paper (Kelp 2015), I argue that both types of accounts remain ultimately unsatisfactory and propose a better alternative.…”
Section: Understanding: the True Accountmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to explanationists, understanding is in essence knowledge of correct explanations (Hempel 1965;Salmon 1984;Khalifa 2012Khalifa , 2013. Manipulationists, on the other hand, claim that understanding is essentially a specific kind of ability, roughly, an ability to perform (certain kinds of) manipulations of (certain kinds of) representations of the phenomena understood (de Regt and Dieks 2005;de Regt 2009a, b;Grimm 2006Grimm , 2014Wilkenfeld 2013. 4 In a recent paper (Kelp 2015), I argue that both types of accounts remain ultimately unsatisfactory and propose a better alternative.…”
Section: Understanding: the True Accountmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…'. 4 Answers to why-questions are typically said to be specific complex propositions of the form (X is the case because of Y) or (p because q), for some q (see, e.g., Grimm 2006Grimm , 2014Pritchard 2008Pritchard , 2014Kelp 2014;Sliwa 2015;Riaz 2015;Hills 2016). Take…”
Section: /33mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Stephen Grimm (2006Grimm ( , 2014, Christoph Kelp (2014), andPaulina Sliwa (2015) argue that coming to believe that (p because q) also requires having an explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related. If they were right, Pritchard's argument for (K-WHY ≠ CAS) would fail, according to his own criteria.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Este proceso de validación es una construcción social, se trata de un conjunto de mensajes e informaciones "consensuadas" por la comunidad, no reflejan un conocimiento transparente y verdadero de lo real sino un proceso de acuerdo inestable (GRIMM, 2006). Complementariamente, otra parte de conocimiento (tácita) no es acumulable en el libro de códigos pero es una dimensión clave y dinámica para producir nuevos mensajes y para interpretar los existentes.…”
Section: Introductionunclassified