The Vacuous Concept of Dignity

Bagaric, Mirko; Allan, James

doi:10.1080/14754830600653603

Cited by 89 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 7 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…The first and more general claim is that the lack of a definition of dignity is undesirable in itself, and contributes to the messiness-and therefore, the uselessness-of the concept. This echoes the criticisms of Bagaric and Allen [1]. The second, and more specific claim, is the claim that dignity is, in any case, analysable into a range of other, more useful concepts, and that we ought to appeal directly to these instead of continuing to bang the 'dignity' drum.…”

Section: Dignity In Legal Literaturesmentioning

confidence: 70%

“…Dignity is a controversial and problematic idea in healthcare law and ethics. 1 Often, it is cited on opposing sides of the same argument: Dupré, for example, notes its deployment as 'a key argument both in favour of and against the legalisation of euthanasia and abortion' ( [1] 266, [3] 191). Dignity is also derided by some as a 'useless' or 'soft' concept which has no place in high-level reasoning.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Dignity is also derided by some as a 'useless' or 'soft' concept which has no place in high-level reasoning. The lack of a settled definition has led Bagaric and Allen to claim that dignity as a concept is 'vacuous' and 'so elusive as to be virtually meaningless' ( [1] 260). They describe dignity as a concept 'without bounds' and say that it is merely 'a notion that is used by academics, judges and legislators when rational justifications have been exhausted' ([1] 260).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Dignity, Law and Language-Games

Neal

2011

Int J Semiot Law

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The aim of this paper is to provide a preliminary defence of the use of the concept of dignity in legal and ethical discourse. This will involve the application of three philosophical insights: (1) Ludwig Wittgenstein's notion of language-games; (2) his related approach to understanding the meanings of words (sometimes summarised as 'meaning is use'); and (3) Jeremy Waldron's layered understanding of property wherein 'property' consists in an abstract concept fleshed out in numerous particular conceptions. These three insights will be applied, in the first place, to the concept of 'dignity', which is chosen here as a good example of a concept which is both vague and contested in legal and ethical discourse, but which can nevertheless be rendered workable by the application of the aforementioned insights. Later, the analysis will be extended briefly to some other troublesome concepts in order to demonstrate its general application. This paper is concerned primarily with formal, rather than substantive questions about dignity. Matters of content will be touched on only insofar as is necessary to illustrate and illuminate my argument about how we ought to approach (rather than answer) questions about dignity. It should be emphasised that because there is no intention of exploring substantive questions in any depth, the discussion here will not delve into the criticisms of 'speciesism' often levelled against the idea of 'human dignity'. 'Speciesist' theories are those that claim that the status, value, or rights of human beings can be regarded as being higher than that of other animals, purely on the basis of their membership of the human species, and without justifying the distinction by pointing to any relevant capacity or characteristic possessed by all and only human beings. For a critical description of speciesism see, e.g., Singer [18] Chapter Three passim; for present purposes, the term 'dignity' will be used synonymously with 'human dignity', and concerns about speciesism will not be considered.

show abstract

Section: Dignity In Legal Literaturesmentioning

confidence: 70%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Dignity, Law and Language-Games

Neal

2011

Int J Semiot Law

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…But this right is not absolute. An infringement may be justifi ed (Article 8 [2]) if it is "in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. "…”

Section: From Ethics To Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dignity and the Ownership and Use of Body Parts

Foster¹

2014

Camb Q Healthc Ethics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Property-based models of the ownership of body parts are common. They are inadequate. They fail to deal satisfactorily with many important problems, and even when they do work, they rely on ideas that have to be derived from deeper, usually unacknowledged principles. This article proposes that the parent principle is always human dignity, and that one will get more satisfactory answers if one interrogates the older, wiser parent instead of the younger, callow offspring. But human dignity has a credibility problem. It is often seen as hopelessly amorphous or incurably theological. These accusations are often just. But a more thorough exegesis exculpates dignity and gives it its proper place at the fountainhead of bioethics. Dignity is objective human thriving. Thriving considerations can and should be applied to dead people as well as live ones. To use dignity properly, the unit of bioethical analysis needs to be the whole transaction rather than (for instance) the doctor-patient relationship. The dignity interests of all the stakeholders are assessed in a sort of utilitarianism. Its use in relation to body part ownership is demonstrated. Article 8(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights endorses and mandates this approach.

show abstract

“…3 For this task we must begin by looking at the long history of the term, which provides some interesting clues. Traditionally, dignitas conveys the idea of a high and honourable rank in a hierarchical order, either in society or in nature.…”

Section: Résumémentioning

confidence: 99%

Human Dignity as High Moral Status1

Toscano

2012

ateliers

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper I argue that the idea of human dignity has a precise and philosophically relevant sense. Following recent works, we can find some important clues in the long history of the term. Traditionally, dignity conveys the idea of a high and honourable position in a hierarchical order, either in society or in nature. At first glance, nothing may seem more contrary to the contemporary conception of human dignity, especially in regard to human rights. However, an account of dignity as high rank provides an illuminating perspective on the role it plays in the egalitarian discourse of human rights. In order to preserve that relational sense regarding human dignity, we can use the notion of moral status, to which some moral philosophers have paid attention in recent years. I explore the possibilities of the idea of moral status to better understand the idea of human dignity and its close relationship with human rights.Cet article défend la thèse que l’idée de la dignité humaine a un sens précis et philosophiquement pertinent. À la suite de travaux récents, il est possible de trouver des moments-clés importants dans la longue histoire de cette idée. Traditionnellement, la dignité exprime l’idée d’une position haute et honorable dans un ordre hiérarchique, soit dans la société ou dans la nature. À première vue, rien ne semble plus contraire à la conception contemporaine de la dignité humaine, en particulier en ce qui concerne les droits de l’homme. Toutefois, une explication de la dignité comme rang élevé offre un éclaircissement sur le rôle qu’elle joue dans le discours égalitaire des droits de l’homme. Afin de préserver ce sens relationnel concernant la dignité humaine, nous pouvons utiliser la notion de statut moral, à laquelle certains philosophes de la morale ont accordé une attention soutenue ces dernières années. J’explore les possibilités de l’idée de statut moral pour mieux comprendre la dignité humaine et sa relation étroite avec les droits de l’homme

show abstract

The Vacuous Concept of Dignity

Cited by 89 publications

References 7 publications

Dignity, Law and Language-Games

Dignity, Law and Language-Games

Dignity and the Ownership and Use of Body Parts

Human Dignity as High Moral Status1

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About