Dignity, Law and Language-Games

Neal, Mary

doi:10.1007/s11196-011-9230-0

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 9 publications

(22 reference statements)

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“…In theoretical dignity literature, which has greatly expanded in recent decades, 16 interpreters will find the dignity idea located within various discourses and constituted by overlapping dimensions pertaining to both substance and function (e.g. Kass 2008;Meltzer Henry 2011;Neal 2012;Riley 2010;Shultziner 2007).…”

Section: The Challenge Of Dignity's Meaningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interpretation of the Prohibition of Torture: Making Sense of ‘Dignity’ Talk

Webster

2016

Hum Rights Rev

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The right not to be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is invariably associated with 'human dignity'. The idea of dignity plays some role in this right's interpretation, although the content of the idea in this context, as in others, is unclear. Making sense of the dignity idea involves a number of challenges. These challenges give rise to the methodological-type question at the heart of this article: how should human rights lawyers go about articulating the content of 'dignity'? The article proposes, and models, a methodological approach in response. Its core argument is that human rights law needs the vocabulary provided by theorizations of dignity but that these theorizations should be anchored in authoritative human rights jurisprudence. It argues that this approach can help make sense of the dignity idea in a way that facilitates a richer understanding of its influence on interpretation.

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Section: The Challenge Of Dignity's Meaningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interpretation of the Prohibition of Torture: Making Sense of ‘Dignity’ Talk

Webster

2016

Hum Rights Rev

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“…Even this form of words is not ideal, however. I have argued elsewhere (Neal, 2012a) that it is essential to recognise that ‘dignity’ is not a single concept, but rather a plurality of concepts grouped under an ‘organising idea’ (see also Pollmann, 2011, p. 248), and describing dignity as ‘ a [single] substantive basic concept’ obscures this important point.…”

Section: Respect For Dignity As the ‘Substantive Basic Norm’mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Nevertheless, much academic enquiry about dignity still focuses on the content or meaning of dignity, asking what dignity values and why, without attending to the question of the role of the dignity norm in legal discourse. 10 I have addressed matters of content elsewhere (Neal, 2012a(Neal, , 2012b, but the purpose of the present enquiry is to continue the emerging discussion of the role in law of what I will refer to hereafter as the 'dignity norm': the requirement, which may be explicit or implicit, written or unwritten, that the equal dignity of all human beings must be respected. 11 Although it will be impossible not to touch upon matters of content in passing at various stages of the discussion, my primary purpose here is not to enquire about the norm's meaning, but to establish its status.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…11Elsewhere (Neal 2012a) I have argued that dignity can (unproblematically) mean different things in different legal contexts; in the present context, I use the phrase ‘dignity norm’ to indicate that my concern here is with general legal norms requiring respect for dignity, in which dignity will often (but not necessarily) be understood as referring to the intrinsic and/or equal worth of human beings.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Respect for human dignity as ‘substantive basic norm’

Neal

2014

International Journal of Law in Context

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The idea of ‘human dignity’ is, notoriously, as ambiguous as it is compelling. Notwithstanding the absence of any clear or settled definition of human dignity, either in the abstract or in terms of what it means in practice, it is an idea which takes pride of place in international legal documents, in judicial reasoning, and in scholarship across a range of disciplines, where it seems, particularly in recent years, to have become the focus for an explosion of academic interest and an accompanying proliferation of literature. Much of the existing literature attempts to uncover the meaning, or multiple meanings, of ‘human dignity’, focusing on the uncertainty surrounding the substance or content of the idea and trying to compose a catalogue of use-types. In this paper, my primary aim will be to address another type of uncertainty, namely uncertainty about the role, function or status within legal frameworks of the ‘dignity norm’ – the norm requiring respect for human dignity. I want to explore several possibilities: first, that the dignity norm is simply a proxy for respect for autonomy; second, that it is a right in the sense that we can speak of a specific ‘right to have dignity respected’; and third, that it is a legal principle. Having problematised each of these in turn, I will contend that the function of the dignity norm is best captured by describing it as the ‘substantive basic norm’ of the legal systems wherein it appears.

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