Human Dignity as High Moral Status1

Abstract

In this paper I argue that the idea of human dignity has a precise and philosophically relevant sense. Following recent works, we can find some important clues in the long history of the term. Traditionally, dignity conveys the idea of a high and honourable position in a hierarchical order, either in society or in nature. At first glance, nothing may seem more contrary to the contemporary conception of human dignity, especially in regard to human rights. However, an account of dignity as high rank provides an illuminating perspective on the role it plays in the egalitarian discourse of human rights. In order to preserve that relational sense regarding human dignity, we can use the notion of moral status, to which some moral philosophers have paid attention in recent years. I explore the possibilities of the idea of moral status to better understand the idea of human dignity and its close relationship with human rights.Cet article défend la thèse que l’idée de la dignité humaine a un sens précis et philosophiquement pertinent. À la suite de travaux récents, il est possible de trouver des moments-clés importants dans la longue histoire de cette idée. Traditionnellement, la dignité exprime l’idée d’une position haute et honorable dans un ordre hiérarchique, soit dans la société ou dans la nature. À première vue, rien ne semble plus contraire à la conception contemporaine de la dignité humaine, en particulier en ce qui concerne les droits de l’homme. Toutefois, une explication de la dignité comme rang élevé offre un éclaircissement sur le rôle qu’elle joue dans le discours égalitaire des droits de l’homme. Afin de préserver ce sens relationnel concernant la dignité humaine, nous pouvons utiliser la notion de statut moral, à laquelle certains philosophes de la morale ont accordé une attention soutenue ces dernières années. J’explore les possibilités de l’idée de statut moral pour mieux comprendre la dignité humaine et sa relation étroite avec les droits de l’homme

Personhood and a meaningful life in African philosophy

“…The possession of these metaphysical capacities or properties makes it a bearer of intrinsic value -a person (Kaufmann 2010). It is in virtue of it being a bearer of intrinsic value that we owe it direct duties of respect (Toscano 2011). Different theories of moral status account for it differently insofar as they invoke different metaphysical properties (see Kant 1996;Singer 2009;Nussbaum 2011).…”

“…The idea of moral status is tantamount to the idea of dignity (see Toscano 2011). The idea of moral status, at least the way I understand it, admits of degrees, where some entities have none, others have some and others have higher moral status (DeGrazia 2008).…”

“…Some scholars talk of partial and full moral status (Metz 2012). The idea of full moral status is the same as that of dignity (Toscano 2011).…”

Individualism in African Moral Cultures

“…"Dignity" is a moral doctrine that attaches intrinsic worth to human nature per se. In other words, the mere fact of being human marks one out as a bearer of special moral features and thus deserving utmost respect (Donnelly, 2009;Toscano, 2011). One has dignity merely because they are human, it is not earned (George and Lee, 2008).…”

“…It is important also because of its deontic restrictions i.e. it serves as a normative constraint over what means we may not use when seeking promote the good (Toscano, 2011). In other words, certain ways of promoting the good are wrong because they fail to regard the high respect due to a human being merely because she is a human being.…”