Individualism in African Moral Cultures

Abstract

This article repudiates the dichotomy that African ethics is communitarian (relational) and Western ethics is individualistic. "Communitarianism" is the view that morality is ultimately grounded on some relational properties like love or friendship; and, "individualism" is the view that morality is ultimately a function of some individual property like a soul or welfare. Generally, this article departs from the intuition that all morality including African ethics, philosophically interpreted, is best understood in terms of individualism. But, in this article, I limit myself to the literature in the African moral tradition; and, I argue that it is best construed in terms of individualism contrary to the popular stance of communitarianism. I defend my view by invoking two sorts of evidences. (1) I invoke prima facie evidence, which shows how both secular and religious moral thinkers in the tradition tend to understand it in individualistic terms. And, (2) I invoke concrete evidence, I show that the two terms that can be said to be definitive features of African ethical framework, namely: personhood and dignity, are individualistic. I conclude by considering possible objections against my defense of individualism as a central feature of African ethics.

Should institutions fund the feedback of individual findings in genomic research?

“…One line of objection to the argument in this article could be that the philosophy which grounds the thesis does not necessarily imply that institutions should fund feedback. Some may also claim that we have misinterpreted the implications of Afro-communitarianism or point out that at least some contributors to African ethics have objected to the emphasis on communitarianism in African philosophy 32. While this article does not claim that all African scholars believe that African philosophy should be considered an essentially communitarian philosophy, the description of African philosophy the article applies aligns with most African philosophers’ views, as demonstrated by a systematic review 22.…”

Rethinking Remote Work, Automated Technologies, Meaningful Work and the Future of Work: Making a Case for Relationality

“…According to Metz ( 2015 ), sub-Saharan Africans consider communal relationships to be the most important aspect of their society over everything else. The idea of what it means to be in a communal relationship for Africans is clearly espoused by sub-Saharan African philosophers such as Mbiti ( 1970 ), Gyekye ( 1996 ), Wiredu ( 1996 ), Tutu ( 1999 ), Molefe ( 2017 ), Ikuenobe ( 2016 ), and Metz ( 2022 ), to mention a few. However, I will expose some of these ideas soon.…”

“…The ontological criterion is that, for one to become a person, the entity has to belong to the human species by possessing what constitutes human nature (Gyekye, 1996 ). However, being a human being is not enough; the individual has to meet some normative requirements, such as communal recognition based on the individual’s moral actions (Ikuenobe, 2016 ; Menkiti, 1984 ; Metz, 2022 ; Molefe, 2017 ; Ugar, 2022 ; Wiredu, 1996 ). These moral actions include, but are not limited to, participating in the activities of the community, participating in the rites of initiation/rites of passage, and building interpersonal relationships with other members of the community.…”

Relational research ethics and disengagement from collaborative research projects in higher education: A conceptual analysis

“…Secondly, it may also happen that a collaborator receives funding for a research project while the other project is still in progress. In this case the researcher is placed in a dichotomised decision-making position or what Molefe (2017b) refers to as hierarchical prioritising: the community or the individual. Because of the managerial demands of the higher education system, one would experience what Molefe (2017a, 55) refers to as "agent-related partiality", where a researcher would prioritise her own projects over others'.…”