The trouble with radicalization

Abstract

Though widely used by academics and policy‐makers in the context of the ‘war on terror’, the concept of radicalization lacks clarity. This article shows that while radicalization is not a myth, its meaning is ambiguous and the major controversies and debates that have sprung from it are linked to the same inherent ambiguity. The principal conceptual fault‐line is between notions of radicalization that emphasize extremist beliefs (‘cognitive radicalization’) and those that focus on extremist behavior (‘behavioural radicalization’). This ambiguity explains the differences between definitions of radicalization; it has driven the scholarly debate, which has revolved around the relationship between cognition and behavior; and it provides the backdrop for strikingly different policy approaches—loosely labeled ‘European’ and ‘Anglo‐Saxon’—which the article delineates and discusses in depth. Rather than denying its validity, the article calls on scholars and policy‐makers to work harder to understand and embrace a concept which, though ambiguous, is likely to dominate research and policy agendas for years to come.

The Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism

“…Both are necessary conditions for political or religious violence, but they do not always produce violence. 19 Cognitive radicalization involves acquiring values, attitudes, and political beliefs that deviate sharply from those of mainstream society. Behavioral radicalization involves participating in a range of radical activities, whether legal or clandestine, which could culminate in terrorism.…”

Subjectivity in detection of radicalisation and violent extremism: a youth worker's perspective

“…12-13;Brown & Saeed, 2015;Cragin, 2014;Schmidt, 2013;Schuurman & Eijkman, 2013). Also terrorism experts have not been able to specify with any certainty when people form a threat to society (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010;Horgan, 2010;Koehler, 2016;Mastroe & Szmania, 2016;Neumann, 2013;Schmidt, 2013;Schuurman, 2017;Schuurman, Eijkman, & Bakker, 2015). Especially when there is no clear evidence of preparation for an attack or incitement to hatred, evaluating the risk an individual poses is a matter of subjective judgment.…”

“…The terminology used in security-driven policy documents does not help practitioners make sense of their mission. One must ask whether the application of a security framework to local authorities' interactions with inhabitants will lead to labelling every deviation in behaviour, expression, and appearance (particularly when dealing with Muslim inhabitants) as a potential risk (de Graaf, 2011;de Graaff, 2008;Eijkman, 2017;Neumann, 2013;Schmidt, 2013;Vellenga, 2012)? As Jenkins (2017) has stated, such prejudices can lead to stigmatisation and impact negatively upon the targeted individual's feelings of safety, equality and solidarity.…”

The university, Prevent and cultures of compliance

“…And so, in the contrived absence of being able to talk about people coming to see the world differently, radically, on the basis of the social, economic and political order that shapes their lives, two approaches to understanding and identifying radicalisation emerge: cognitive radicalisation and behavioural radicalisation (Neumann, 2013). What an individual might say and how they might act in the everyday, other than in ways that evidence support for violence or violent acts themselves, become indicators of radicalisation.…”