Subjectivity in detection of radicalisation and violent extremism: a youth worker's perspective

Abstract

This article explores the challenges local youth workers face at the intersection of providing social care and detecting violent extremism. Extremism and other radical ideologies are often assumed to be a harbinger of terrorism. Even though both are still a rare phenomenon among adolescents, European states have become highly concerned with being alert to early signs of radicalisation processes. As a result, youth workers as well as other local professionals have been confronted with the task of detecting these early signs. However, despite training and increased knowledge, the question remains whether youth workers are sufficiently equipped to assess potential risks in youth who show no concrete plans for criminal action. In these cases, prevention targets ideas rather than violent behaviour. This article details qualitative results of a case study among Dutch youth workers and suggests that no clear framework exists for detection of radicalisation processes into (violent) extremism. This has two main causes. Firstly, the concepts of radicalisation and (violent) extremism are in practice difficult to distinguish. Secondly, the youth worker's judgement often relies more on individual perceptions rather than evidence-based criteria to identify potential 'risky' persons. This situation may lead to undesired side effects such as executive arbitrariness, prejudice or stigmatisation. ARTICLE HISTORY

Early detection of extremism? The local security professional on assessment of potential threats posed by youth

“…It must, for example, become clear whether the aim is to prevent all forms of radicalism, to identify individuals who pose a threat or to support those who seem at risk of 'dropping out' of society? In order to obtain clarity on these matters, it is of primary importance that frontline professionals become aware of the (legal) difference between radicalization in general and the willingness to commit extremist violence [19,61]. After all, what violent extremism and terrorism have in common is their ideological motives for committing violence.…”

“…When a front-line professional operates preventively in the area between social welfare and early-detection of violent extremism, his/her judgment is particularly unstructured and not entirely objective. Such was the outcome of the few studies about early detection that have been conducted among front-line practitioners so far (e.g., Aly, Balbi & Jacques [15]; [16][17][18][19]). This outcome seemed to stem from a lack in the necessary development of knowledge that has taken place among local security experts, in the inconsistent use of concepts such as radicalization and (violent) extremism, and in doubts about the ability to accurately assess potential risk at such a level.…”

“…In the end, no one-not even terrorism experts-can say for sure when someone actually poses a threat, until the point at which the individual engages in concrete activities [29]. Early detection and investigation are, therefore, based mainly on estimations and personal moral judgement [19].…”

Examining “Prevent” from a Former Combatant Perspective

“…Given that Prevent's observing gaze is so broad and banal, and when working practices are context-dependent and reliant upon the imagination of possible futures, the subjective intuition of its practitioners is required to spot where risk may reside (Elshimi, 2017;Pettinger, 2019;van de Weert and Eijkman, 2019). Situated in the pre-or non-criminal space, the preemptive rationality is mobilized through imagination (Amoore, 2013) and the speculative guesswork of practitioners, because the supposed risk has by definition not yet materialized.…”

“…The chapter builds on numerous critiques of dominant radicalization theories by anticipatory risk-governance literature, a field which contests the scientific and moral validity of counter-terrorism interventions on non-criminal behaviours and thoughts (Heath-Kelly, 2012,2017aAradau and van Munster, 2012;Scarcella, Page, and Furtado, 2016;Elshimi, 2017;Silva, 2018;Martin, 2018;Knudsen, 2018;Altermark and Nilsson, 2018;Stephens et al, 2019;Pettinger, 2019;van de Weert and Eijkman, 2019). It is also informed by the significant historical terrorism literature, which consistently draws a different conclusion than the individualized and pathologized conclusions of contemporary radicalization literature, by pointing to political environments as producing, or at least contributing to violence (Crenshaw, 1981;Ross, 1993;Silke, 2003;Bjørgo, 2005;Pape, 2005;Burgess and Ferguson, 2009;Basra, Neumann and Brunner, 2016;Crone, 2016).…”