2013
DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2013.04.010
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The time travelling self: Comparing self and other in narratives of past and future events

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Cited by 67 publications
(73 citation statements)
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References 38 publications
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“…This is consistent with our finding that episodic memories were more detailed and sensory rich than the two imagined event categories. Second, as predicted, and in line with previous findings (e.g., Berntsen & Bohn, 2010;Grysman, et al, 2013;Kane, et al, 2012;Newby-Clark & Ross, 2003;Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013;Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, & Phelps, 2007, Van Boven & Ashworth, 2007, future projections were conceived as highly positive and idealized, whereas episodic counterfactuals did not show such positivity bias. This finding supports our hypothesis that episodic counterfactuals and episodic future thoughts have different phenomenological characteristics, even though they are both simulations of hypothetical events.…”
supporting
confidence: 76%
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“…This is consistent with our finding that episodic memories were more detailed and sensory rich than the two imagined event categories. Second, as predicted, and in line with previous findings (e.g., Berntsen & Bohn, 2010;Grysman, et al, 2013;Kane, et al, 2012;Newby-Clark & Ross, 2003;Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013;Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, & Phelps, 2007, Van Boven & Ashworth, 2007, future projections were conceived as highly positive and idealized, whereas episodic counterfactuals did not show such positivity bias. This finding supports our hypothesis that episodic counterfactuals and episodic future thoughts have different phenomenological characteristics, even though they are both simulations of hypothetical events.…”
supporting
confidence: 76%
“…vs. 1 day). Grysman, Prabhakar, Anglin, and Hudson (2013) examined self and other (close friend and non-close friend)…”
Section: Past and Future Mental Time Travelmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…For example, cue-word methods lead to comparisons of reaction times for retrieval or of numbers of memories recalled (e.g., Davis, 1999;Robinson, 1976;Ros & Latorre, 2010). Within narrativebased analyses, researchers can ask for any event that occurred within a specified time period (e.g., Grysman, Prabhakar, Anglin, & Hudson, 2013;Kanten & Teigen, 2008), which has the advantage of imposing limited bias on the memory search process, but may elicit mundane memories rather than personally significant events. Other studies explicitly solicit a specific type of event, often a highly emotional event (a high or low point: e.g., Grysman & Hudson, 2010; or a traumatic memory: e.g., Sales, Fivush, Parker, & Bahrick, 2005) or a self-defining memory (Singer & Salovey, 1993;see, e.g., Liao, Bluck, & Cheng, 2015).…”
Section: Event Type In Memory Elicitationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Cognitive processes are susceptible to several biases. For example, across the lifespan, people tend to consider future events as more positive than past events [14]. Contrarilly, the activation of the ruminative mechanism-in particular, a heightened ruminative disposition-leads to elevated emotional extrapolation from current events when formulating future expectancies, even in nonclinical samples.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%