The textile bill of 1985: The determinants of congressional voting patterns

Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence

“…Tosini and Tower (1987) find that the percentage of campaign contributions donated by interest groups of the textile industry had a significant impact on representatives for a specific protectionist textile bill, but not on senators. An explanation could be that in the time period considered by the authors the entire House was up for reelection, whereas only one third of the Senate was in the process of campaigning.…”

“…Nelson andSilverberg, 1987, Peltzman, 1984), other studies focus on differences in opportunity costs among legislators typically caused by reelection considerations (e.g. Bender, 1991, Davis and Porter, 1989, Kalt and Zupan, 1984, McArthur and Marks, 1988, Tosini and Tower, 1987.…”

The bigger the better? Evidence of the effect of government size on life satisfaction around the world

“…7 Grossman and Helpman (1996) construct a model that shows how policy outcomes can easily be influenced by such interest groups. For empirical evidence see Tosini and Tower (1987), among others. 8 The same model explains the positive correlation between economic development and the absolute size of the government sector.…”

“…To the contrary, Dreher (2005) finds no significant impact of left-wing governments on government total and social spending in OECD countries over the period 1970-2000. 15 For empirical support on the influence of party ideology on votes about free-trade issues, see Baldwin (1985), Tosini and Tower (1987), among others. the other hand, vote-maximizing political parties might carry out such a transfer policy either to induce a shift in central votes to their favour or in favour of their own supporters, depending on the specific set-up of the model Londregan, 1996, 1998).…”

Financiamento de campanha e apoio parlamentar à Agenda Legislativa da Indústria na Câmara dos Deputados

“…Para uma discussão aplicada, ver Grier e Munger (1993). 2 Para alguns trabalhos que identificam efeito positivo do financiamento sobre o comportamento parlamentar, ver : Silberman e Durden (1976), Feldstein e Melnick (1984), Frendreis e Waterman (1985), Coughlin (1985), Schroedel (1986), Langbein (1986), Wilhite e Theilmann (1986;1987), Tosini e Tower (1987), Saltzman (1987), Jones e Kaiser (1987), Masters e Zardkoohi (1988), Wilhite e Paul (1989), Langbein e Lotwis (1990), Neustadtl (1990), Hall e Wayman (1990), Davis (1993), Stratmann (1991;1998;, Durden, Shogren e Silberman (1991) e Holian e Krebs (1997). 3 Para exemplos de trabalhos que não identificam efeito do financiamento sobre a atuação parlamentar, ver: Kau e Rubin (1978), Welch (1982), Chappell (1982), Wright (1985), Grenzke (1989), Dow e Endersby (1994), Bronars e Lott (1997) e Wawro (2001).…”