The technical basis for spectrum rights: Policies to enhance market efficiency

Matheson, Robert J.; Morris, Adele C.

doi:10.1016/j.telpol.2012.05.006

Cited by 22 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…5 The literature on the management of Common Pool Resources (CPR) provides a useful framework for examining alternative options for the design of spectrum rights bundles and their management that explicitly forces joint consideration of the socio-technical 4 Bowker et al [6] define infrastructure to include all of the technology and tangible elements (i.e., the machines, bricks & mortar, roads, etc.) as well as the standards, business processes and other intangibles that together help define how infrastructure is used and evolves.…”

Section: Spectrum As a Common Pool Resourcementioning

confidence: 99%

“…De Vany [2] and Matheson [3], [4] . This is partly the case because the received signal strength of electromagnetic signals varies randomly.…”

Section: Polycentric Governance Of Spectrummentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If SAS-based spectrum sharing systems achieve even a small level of success, they promise to be an "infrastructure" as defined by Bowker et al [6] as a "pervasive enabling resource". 4 As such they are a technical embodiment of a particular set of social agreements.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Socio-technical considerations for Spectrum Access System (SAS) design

Weiss

Lehr²,

Acker

et al. 2015

2015 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN)

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Abstract-Spectrum Access Systems (SAS) are emerging as a principal mechanism for managing the sharing of radio spectrum. The design of the SAS depends on the specification of spectrum property rights and the governance system by which those rights are enforced. Current perspectives on SAS design have been too limited, focusing narrowly on the technical components without adequate consideration of socio-technical factors that will impact the likely success of any SAS design.In this paper, we apply the social science literature on the management of common pool resources (CPR) to the design challenge for the SAS. Heretofore, too much of the discussion has focused on an overly simplistic characterization of the spectrum rights design space as a dichotomous choice between licensed v. unlicensed, markets v. government, and exclusive v. open. The CPR framework forces consideration of a wider class of design options, positioning the specifications of spectrum property rights more appropriately along a multi-dimensional continuum of rights bundles. The CPR framework highlights the importance of considering formal and informal, multi-layered institutional and market-based interactions among SAS stakeholders when designing a resource management system. We will explain how this leads one to view the SAS as a polycentric governance system (using the terminology in the CPR literature). By examining the economic and social context of spectrum sharing, we assert that these emerging systems must be sufficiently flexible to adapt to various forms of resource governance, which refers to the process by which rights are distributed among stakeholders, how those rights are enforced, and how the resource is managed. We illustrate how the insights from the CPR literature might be implemented in a prototype SAS architecture.

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Section: Spectrum As a Common Pool Resourcementioning

confidence: 99%

“…De Vany [2] and Matheson [3], [4] . This is partly the case because the received signal strength of electromagnetic signals varies randomly.…”

Section: Polycentric Governance Of Spectrummentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Socio-technical considerations for Spectrum Access System (SAS) design

Weiss

Lehr²,

Acker

et al. 2015

2015 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN)

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“…TAS is said to define an electrospace. Matheson and Morris [15] expand this to a seven dimensional model, which includes frequency, time, three dimensions of location (latitude, longitude, and elevation) and two possible directions of arrival (azimuth and elevation angles) and apply it in an attempt to define an exclusive rights region. It is important to note that interference and noise are stochastic processes, which vary with time and location so that exclusion may not be complete.…”

Section: Spectrum Related Rightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dimensions of cooperative spectrum sharing: Rights and enforcement

Liu

Gomez

Weiss

2014

2014 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DYSPAN)

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Abstract-Sharing of radio spectrum requires a careful and nuanced understanding of the rights of incumbents and spectrum entrants. In addition, the dynamics of stakeholders can be understood by examining how various rights are arranged (and rearranged) among them. Importantly, understanding the rights and their distribution is the predicate to developing rational and useful enforcement approaches.In this paper, we show that spectrum sharing involves a rearrangement of the rights associated with radio spectrum among stakeholders. We show how this rearrangement of rights implies the definition of new bundles of rights, appropriate to each particular sharing scenario. We discover these rights -and their (re)arrangement) -by examining several cases of spectrum use. We begin with the rights associated with exclusive use and proceed to consider rights arrangement in commons and different spectrum sharing configurations. Further, in the case of commons, we explicitly examine how governance of commons can affect the rights distribution in spectrum. In each case, the bundles of rights associated with each stakeholder changes.New bundles of rights have consequences, not only on the behavior of spectrum users but also on the enforcement process. Our examination of the bundles of rights shows that each rearrangement results in different approaches to enforcement. We demonstrate this by revisiting enforcement in the cases we examine.

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“…Nevertheless, when we think about electromagnetic spectrum, its variability and multidimensionality are the features that will mostly draw our attention. Various authors define a number of these dimensions; for instance, in [10] Matheson and Morris define seven dimensions in which spectrum can vary: frequency, time, three dimensions of location (latitude, longitude and elevation) and two dimensions of arrival (azimuth and elevation angles). For a market to be successful, we would need a "one-toone" match of supply and demand, or in other words, as Mayo and Wallsten express in [6], "Successful secondary market transfers require an alignment of the buyers' demands for spectrum of a particular dimension with the willingness of spectrum holders to supply spectrum in the same dimension".…”

Section: The Appropriate Trading Commoditymentioning

confidence: 99%

Trading Wireless Capacity Through Spectrum Virtualization Using LTE-A

2014

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Markets for spectrum were first proposed by Ronald Coase [1] as a way to efficiently allocate this resource. It took another forty years for primary markets to be developed (in the form of spectrum auctions) as the mechanism for assigning spectrum licenses to users. It is not a secret that secondary markets would be necessary to fully realize the benefits of economic allocation of spectrum. But this is easier said than done, since spectrum is a complex, multi-dimensional product with relatively few buyers and sellers (at least for commercial mobile services), so liquid secondary markets have not emerged, even though spectrum trading through brokers is commonplace.In this paper, we find that liquidity for spectrum markets can be improved over "naked" spectrum markets [2, 3] when a standardized commodity can be traded that uses the principles of spectrum virtualization [4]. We utilize the Physical Resource Blocks (PRBs) of LTE-Advanced as the traded commodity and modify the SPEC-TRAD model developed in [5] accordingly. Though much remains to be done, we find that this is a promising approach to finally realizing liquid secondary markets in radio spectrum.

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The technical basis for spectrum rights: Policies to enhance market efficiency

Cited by 22 publications

References 3 publications

Socio-technical considerations for Spectrum Access System (SAS) design

Socio-technical considerations for Spectrum Access System (SAS) design

Dimensions of cooperative spectrum sharing: Rights and enforcement

Trading Wireless Capacity Through Spectrum Virtualization Using LTE-A

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