The Surprising Success of Multiparty Presidentialism

Pereira, Carlos; Melo, Marcus André

doi:10.1353/jod.2012.0041

Cited by 42 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Attempting to reach out to the opposition through possible coalition formation seems to be an alternative. Based on recent analysis on the stability of multiparty presidentialism (Pereira and Melo, 2012), it is possible to speculate that a stable co-operation between the Mexican national executive with the national legislative rests on the ability of the PRI in strategically engaging with the PAN and PRD in key issues.…”

Section: The 2012 Presidential and Congressional Electoral Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The 2012 Elections in Mexico: The Birth of a Consolidated Federal Democracy?

Vale

Wences

2013

Regional & Federal Studies

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In 2012, the simultaneous elections at the federal, state and municipal levels in Mexico reopened the debate about the path of democratic consolidation in the country. With the return of the Revolutionary Institutional Party to the presidency in 2013, there are renewed signs that Mexican democratic consolidation is underway. Particularly important in this process is that the 2012 gubernatorial and mayoral elections have been more competitive, resulting in higher political alternation in power between political parties. Under a changing subnational political context, there are indications that subnational politicians are no longer under the shadow of a dominant party system. As a more consolidated federal democracy, the political landscape in Mexico has become more complex.

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Section: The 2012 Presidential and Congressional Electoral Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The 2012 Elections in Mexico: The Birth of a Consolidated Federal Democracy?

Vale

Wences

2013

Regional & Federal Studies

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“…Many scholars suggested that the combination of presidential regimes and multiparty systems would result in political instability, thereby impeding the continuity of the new democratic regimes (Mainwaring 1993;Stepan and Skach 1993). Although those pessimistic predictions were not realised (Pereira and Melo 2012), tensions between the executive and legislative branches of government remained central to analyses of Latin American presidential regimes (Alemán and Navia 2009). For this reason, studies of Latin American presidential institutions have focused on testing hypotheses that were first developed in the American literature and then adapted to the specificities of Latin American politics, especially the multiparty system.…”

Section: American Presidentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Presidents, Legislators, and Foreign Policy in Latin America

Ribeiro

Pinheiro

2016

Contexto int.

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Which factors determine legislative support for the foreign policy initiatives of Latin American presidents? How do political parties and politicians behave when dealing with presidential foreign policy? The issue of whether presidents exercise greater influence over foreign or domestic affairs has been extensively debated in recent years, and the evidence indicates that legislators do behave differently when dealing with foreign policy proposals. Building on this debate, we analyse legislative support for the foreign policies of 22 Latin-American presidents in eight countries from 1994 to 2014, using an original dataset in a quantile regression framework. We also use three selected cases to illustrate our evidence. Our findings are counter-intuitive and bring new elements into the debate about legislative behaviour towards foreign policy in presidential countries. Measures of a political party's ideology, the size of the governing coalition, and the effective number of parties (ENP) play important roles in levels of legislative support for presidential foreign policy agendas. Surprisingly, the popularity of presidents and the nature of their initiatives -high or low politics -do not affect these levels of support.

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“…Presidents in Latin America can introduce bills, veto laws, legislate by decree during emergencies, and have preeminence in the making of annual budgets (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997;Shugart and Carey, 1992). As a result, presidents have been endowed with larger legislative powers to get their policy agenda passed (Pereira and Melo, 2012) and this has helped the executive to win greater leverage vis-à-vis the legislature over time (Mustapic, 1997). Constitutional reforms after the third wave of democratization have systematically enlarged presidential agenda power (Negretto, 2009).…”

Section: The Role Of Congress Presidents and Governors In Distributmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who Distributes? Presidents, Congress, Governors, and the Politics of Distribution in Argentina and Brazil

González¹,

Mamone²

2015

RIEL

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Abstract. What is the role of presidents in the politics of distribution in developing democracies? To whatextent do other political actors, such as legislators and governors, influence federal distribution? This paper studies the main factors that affect distributive politics in Argentina and Brazil, two highly unequal presidential federations in Latin America. The focus is on funds with high redistributive impact and over which the central government has large discretion: those for public infrastructure. Using original data on federal infrastructure spending for the 24 provinces in Argentina and the 27 states in Brazil for the period 1999-2011, we show that the distribution of infrastructure funds is fundamentally determined by executive politics. Despite this, our empirical findings indicate there is large variation between the two cases in the relevance of the partisan links between presidents and governors and the influence of congress and its committees. Furthermore, we observe that elections are not relevant in explaining distribution in either of the two cases and that presidents are mostly motivated by political considerations and that programmatic factors, such as equity and efficiency criteria, play a secondary role, especially in Argentina. We discuss some possible reasons for these results and their implications for the broader comparative debate on distributive politics.

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The Surprising Success of Multiparty Presidentialism

Cited by 42 publications

References 11 publications

The 2012 Elections in Mexico: The Birth of a Consolidated Federal Democracy?

The 2012 Elections in Mexico: The Birth of a Consolidated Federal Democracy?

Presidents, Legislators, and Foreign Policy in Latin America

Who Distributes? Presidents, Congress, Governors, and the Politics of Distribution in Argentina and Brazil

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