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This article explains how judicial review influences intergovernmental political dynamics in Brazil, Colombia and Spain. The argument is developed in light of two questions: how supreme courts have established themselves as pivotal institutions for settling vertical intergovernmental disputes, and how national and subnational politicians use judicial review in order to enhance their own interests. A comparison between the judicial review processes in federal Brazil, quasi-federal Spain, and unitary Colombia provides an answer to these questions. Accounting for the differences in the territorial organization and systems of government among these countries, the article assesses the patterns of judicial review originating from the subnational level. Findings suggest that courts affect the interaction between national and subnational politicians in the three country-cases, but through different patterns of judicialization of territorial politics.

This article proposes a theoretical framework to analyze conditional cash transfer programs, as the result of a process of social policy innovation in Brazil. The analysis reveals a traceable process of innovation behind the creation of two of these programs, Bolsa Família and Bolsa Verde. By focusing on the main drivers in the emergence of Brazilian cash transfer programs, the article analyzes the innovations in their evolution and shows that these programs are part of sequential policy learning. By exploring the drivers, actors, and phases of social policy innovation in Brazil, the article contributes to the literature on cash transfer programs by theorizing on how these social assistance programs innovate, endure, and expand over time. Furthermore, Brazil's trajectory of social assistance development dissected in this article reveals Bolsa Família and Bolsa Verde as outcomes of institutional dynamics that attempted to foster social investment and to reduce risks of poverty. In terms of specific contributions, the article identifies and delves into the configuration of multilevel network supporting cash transfer programs and the sequential phases of the development of these programs in Brazil that reveal a policy learning mechanism.

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Much of the scholarly work on Brazilian federalism has long focused on the ways in which decentralization has produced institutional paralysis under intergovernmental conflict. This article, by contrast, suggests that Brazil has been under a gradual transformation since its democratization, which led to a recentralization of power in the hands of the federal government. It presents a framework that explains how an initial decentralization process (1983-1994) turned into a centralization process (1995-2007) that ultimately increased the regulatory and coordination powers of the Brazilian federal government. In addition, the analysis shows that two main blocs of political parties competed to influence the sequence and speed of legislation related to the decentralization and centralization processes. Specifically, these parties used two competing temporal strategies – foot-dragging and pace-setting – to slow down or accelerate the approval of legislation regulating subnational autonomy. Once the centralizing bloc of parties enacted key centralizing legislation, they used the strategy of fence-building to institutionalize intergovernmental relations, thereby consolidating the coordination powers of the center. The main contribution of this article is to advance a temporal approach to federal changes, which explains how the Brazilian federal government centralized authority under a decentralizing Constitution.