The Strategy of Social Protest.

Monti, Daniel J.; Gamson, William A.; Tilly, Charles; Tilly, Louise A.; Tilly, Richard

doi:10.2307/2576188

Cited by 11 publications

(16 citation statements)

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“…2. While it may be tempting to assume that the threat or use of violence differentiates what are labeled "terrorist organizations" from nonterrorist organizations, the reality is that many organizations that avoid the terrorist label have in fact used violence, the threat of violence, and other activities associated with terrorism to achieve political ends, including labor unions and governments (Tilly and Tarrow 2007;Gamson 1990;Litwack 1962; see also Goodwin 2014). 3.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why “Dissident” Irish Republicans Haven’t Gone Away

White

2021

Contention

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When considering “terrorists” and “terrorism,” the focus tends to be on violence—the threat of violence, its aftermath, the ideology and belief systems that lead to it, and so forth. Political violence, however, represents only a portion of the repertoire of collective action that is available to “terrorists.” Images from “dissident” Irish Republican events and photo-elicitation interviews with activists who participated in these events show that: (1) the repertoire of “violent” organizations includes nonviolent political activity; and (2) the organizational structures and affective incentives that sustain activism in nonviolent voluntary associations and social movement organizations also sustain activism in organizations that embrace physical force or “terrorism.” In combination, these findings show that “dissident” Irish Republicans are likely to persist into the foreseeable future. More generally, the findings also show that our understanding of “terrorists” and “terrorist organizations” will be enhanced if we focus less on their violent activities and more on their similarities with nonviolent activists and organizations.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why “Dissident” Irish Republicans Haven’t Gone Away

White

2021

Contention

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“…This option challenges the goal attainment approach's assessment of variable selection. The goalattainment approach is 'based on the assumption that organizations' goals are identifiable and unambiguous' (Forbes, 1998: 185) and has been contentious in the literature (Tilly, 1999;Gamson, 1990). Selecting only variables matching a movement's stated goals ignores the dynamics of the conflict landscape.…”

Section: Defining Successmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Of concern is the common exclusion of lowlevel outcomes, such as recognizing the legitimacy of demonstrators' anger. As movements in Western democracies easily attain governmental and public recognition for their grievance legitimacy and salience, the conflict scholarship moved 'away from addressing whether movements of organizations are successful in gaining new benefits or acceptance (Gamson, 1990)' (Amenta et al, 2010: 289). Low level outcomes, like recognition, were dropped from models as studies shifted to 'examining the causal influence of movements on political outcomes and processes drawn from political sociology literature' (Amenta et al, 2010: 289).…”

Section: Defining Successmentioning

confidence: 99%

A win or a flop? Measuring mass protest successfulness in authoritarian settings

Turner

2023

Journal of Peace Research

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Previously rare events, mass protest movements have become popular vehicles for those seeking political, economic, and social change. How do we evaluate movement success? Most studies addressing movement outcomes are grounded in the goal attainment approach, where movement success is dependent upon fulfilling one’s stated demands. The models derived from this approach heavily rely on visibility and transparency in the policymaking process. These offer limited analytical utility for scholars studying movements in authoritarian states, where policymaking is shrouded and media is state-controlled. Evaluating movements solely on their fulfillment of mission goals is highly problematic, as movements produce more outcomes than their intended goals. Movements also produce unintended benefits: concessions unrelated to the movement’s mission. These include negative consequences, or societal costs. Since movements produce both positive and negative unintended outcomes, any evaluation of a movement should also incorporate the costs associated with new gains. I argue a cost–benefit approach improves scholarly conceptualization and measurement of protest success. I conceptualize protest success as multidimensional and comprised of protest gains and societal costs. I develop a 21-point scale of protest success using Mokken Scale Analysis. AISP diagnostics indicate gains and costs comprise separate subscales, which are collapsed to produce total sum scores. I score 34 nonviolent movements in authoritarian states between 2002 and 2013 on an additive scale. Protests in authoritarian settings attain considerable accomplishments; however, those gains come with significant cost. Most total success scores are negative, indicating considerable backlash is common during and immediately after the demobilization of movements in authoritarian states. Success scores improve upon the canonical binary measure by: (1) offering improved discrimination between movements, (2) identifying cases of regime ‘ignoring’, and (3) pinpointing misclassified cases. By incorporating negative consequences into our evaluations, we advance our understanding why movements deemed successful by scholars are disappointments to their home publics.

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“…All social movement theories hold that the capacity to deploy tactics is critical for gaining and sustaining advantages (Gamson 1975;McAdam 1983). We define tactics as recognized patterns of activities that express the claims and demands of protesters.…”

Section: Social Movement Tacticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although processes of competition and legitimation have been analyzed mainly for organizational populations, there were good reasons to explore these processes in a population of social movements. First, there is a long history of examining organizational processes of bureaucratization, recruitment, and centralization in a social movement context (Gamson 1975;McCarthy and Zald 1977). Second, research tion.The measure that was available to us calculates the percentage of women working 21 hours per week or more and so omits many women working fewer hours.…”

Section: Expanding the Scope Of Density Dependence Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Ecology of Tactical Overlap

Olzak

Uhrig

2001

Am Sociol Rev

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Does sharing protest tactics influence the trajectory of protest activities among social movements? Focusing on the New Social Movements (NSMs), the authors apply concepts that have proven useful in the study of organizations. These concepts suggest that legitimation and competition processes influence both the upward and downward trajectories of protest. The sharing of tactics is specified in terms of increased overlap in the tactical repertoire of social movements composing a given cohort. A tactical overlap index is calculated between women's protest activities and activities generated by all other New Social Movements in West Germany, from 1953 through 1990. Results suggest that tactical overlap has a nonmonotonic effect on levels of protest activity generated by the West German women's movement.

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The Strategy of Social Protest.

Cited by 11 publications

References 0 publications

Why “Dissident” Irish Republicans Haven’t Gone Away

Why “Dissident” Irish Republicans Haven’t Gone Away

A win or a flop? Measuring mass protest successfulness in authoritarian settings

The Ecology of Tactical Overlap

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