The status of the knowledge account of assertion

Hindriks, Frank

doi:10.1007/s10988-007-9019-5

Cited by 71 publications

(46 citation statements)

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“…In conjunction with the knowledge rule of belief, according to which one must: believe that p only if one knows that p (4), we get the result that, in situations of normal trust, one must assert that p only if one knows that p (5). And this, of course, is a restricted version of K Rule (Hindriks : 403).…”

Section: Function First or Rule First?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(Douven , , Lackey , , Gerken , McKinnon , ) or justified belief (Kvanvig , ). Slightly less popular, at least among epistemologists, are the truth rule (Weiner , Whiting ) and the belief rule (Bach , Hindriks ).Another issue is whether the epistemic rule of assertion is context‐sensitive in the sense that what is required for epistemically permissible assertion varies across contexts. Most champions of context‐sensitivity opt for a version of the justification rule of assertion and maintain that the degree of justification needed for epistemically permissible assertion varies with context (Gerken, McKinnon and, arguably, Lackey).…”

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Assertion: A Function First Account

Kelp

2016

Nous

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This paper aims to develop a novel account of the normativity of assertion. Its core thesis is that assertion has an etiological epistemic function, viz. to generate knowledge in hearers. In conjunction with a general account of etiological functions and their normative import, it is argued that an assertion is epistemically good if and only if it has the disposition to generate knowledge in hearers. In addition, reason is provided to believe that it makes sense to regulate the practice of assertion by a speaker rule—and, more specifically, by a knowledge rule—as so regulating assertion contributes to ensuring that assertion fulfils its etiological function reliably.

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Section: Function First or Rule First?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Assertion: A Function First Account

Kelp

2016

Nous

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“…On Stalnaker's account of conversational context, a context may be understood as a set of possible worlds C, where C:= {w: w is a live option in the context}. Similarly, the content of an assertion that p is a set of worlds 2 In a recent paper, F. Hindriks (2007) has advanced a similar sort of argument for deriving the AK norm from the linkage between belief and knowledge. (cf.…”

Section: More On the Ak Normmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemological Contextualism and the Knowledge Account of Assertion

Shieber

2008

Philosophia

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In this paper, I take up an argument advanced by Keith DeRose (Philosophical Review, 111:167-203, 2002) that suggests that the knowledge account of assertion provides the basis of an argument in favor of contextualism. I discuss the knowledge account as the conjunction of two theses-a thesis claiming that knowledge is sufficient to license assertion KA and one claiming that knowledge is necessary to license assertion AK. Adducing evidence from Stalnaker's account of assertion, from conversational practice, and from arguments often raised in favor of the knowledge account, I suggest that neither the AK nor the KA theses are plausible. That is, I argue that the knowledge account of assertion to which DeRose appeals is in fact not suitable as an account of assertion. Given that DeRose's argument stands and falls with the knowledge account, I claim that the argument therefore fails.

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“…Stanley (2007) argues for an even stronger constraint: that we should only assert p if we are certain that p. Douven (2006) argues that truth is neither sufficient nor necessary, so the norm should be assert only what is rationally credible. Bach (forthcoming) and Hindriks (2007) both suggest that the only real norm governing assertion is belief, but that since knowledge is a norm of belief, we shouldn't generally assert what we do not know. In this paper we're not concerned with the question of whether The Knowledge Rule holds solely in virtue of the normative nature of assertion itself, as Williamson thinks, or partly in virtue of norms applying to related states like belief, as Bach and Hindriks suggest, but rather whether the rule is even a good rule.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assertion, knowledge, and action

Maitra

Weatherson

2010

Philos Stud

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We argue against the knowledge rule of assertion, and in favour of integrating the account of assertion more tightly with our best theories of evidence and action. We think that the knowledge rule has an incredible consequence when it comes to practical deliberation, that it can be right for a person to do something that she can't properly assert she can do. We develop some vignettes that show how this is possible, and how odd this consequence is. We then argue that these vignettes point towards alternate rules that tie assertion to sufficient evidence-responsiveness or to proper action. These rules have many of the virtues that are commonly claimed for the knowledge rule, but lack the knowledge rule's problematic consequences when it comes to assertions about what to do.

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The status of the knowledge account of assertion

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Cited by 71 publications

References 10 publications

Assertion: A Function First Account

Assertion: A Function First Account

Epistemological Contextualism and the Knowledge Account of Assertion

Assertion, knowledge, and action

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