Assertion: A Function First Account

Abstract

This paper aims to develop a novel account of the normativity of assertion. Its core thesis is that assertion has an etiological epistemic function, viz. to generate knowledge in hearers. In conjunction with a general account of etiological functions and their normative import, it is argued that an assertion is epistemically good if and only if it has the disposition to generate knowledge in hearers. In addition, reason is provided to believe that it makes sense to regulate the practice of assertion by a speaker rule—and, more specifically, by a knowledge rule—as so regulating assertion contributes to ensuring that assertion fulfils its etiological function reliably.

Assertion: The context shiftiness dilemma

“…Nothing here hinges on this. 18 For support of this claim, see Kelp (2014Kelp ( , 2018Reynolds (2002); Goldberg (2015); Turri (2016); and Williamson (2000).…”

“… For support of this claim, see Kelp (, ; Reynolds (); Goldberg (); Turri (); and Williamson (). Contra the account employed here, Ruth Millikan () and Peter Graham (2012) take the function of assertion to be generating true belief rather than knowledge in one's audience. If they are right, one could wonder, would it not be reasonable to suppose that assertion is governed by a corresponding truth norm?…”

Assertion: knowledge is enough

“…For support for KNA along these lines, see e.g.,Reynolds (2002),Kelp (2015),Simion (2015). B Mona Simion mona.simion@hiw.kuleuven.be 1 KU Leuven Centre for Logic and Analytic Philosophy, Andreas Vesaliusstraat 2, 3000 Leuven, Belgium…”

Moral Assertion

“…For defences see e.g. (Kelp 2018;Benton 2011;Hawthorne 2004;Simion 2016;Turri 2011;Unger 1975;Williamson 2000). 3 The related non-reductionism about testimonial knowledge is the most popular view on testimonial knowledge.…”