Abstract:We argue against the knowledge rule of assertion, and in favour of integrating the account of assertion more tightly with our best theories of evidence and action. We think that the knowledge rule has an incredible consequence when it comes to practical deliberation, that it can be right for a person to do something that she can't properly assert she can do. We develop some vignettes that show how this is possible, and how odd this consequence is. We then argue that these vignettes point towards alternate rule… Show more
“… For notable critiques of the Knowledge Account of Assertion, see Weiner (), Lackey (), Brown (), Stanley (), Sosa (), Brown (), and Maitra and Weatherson (). For notable critiques of the Knowledge Account of Action, see Brown (), Neta (), Lackey (), and Gerken (). …”
Here I advance a unified account of the structure of the epistemic normativity of assertion, action, and belief. According to my Teleological Account, all of these are epistemically successful just in case they fulfill the primary aim of knowledgeability, an aim which in turn generates a host of secondary epistemic norms. The central features of the Teleological Account are these: it is compact in its reliance on a single central explanatory posit, knowledge‐centered in its insistence that knowledge sets the fundamental epistemic norm, and yet fiercely pluralistic in its acknowledgment of the legitimacy and value of a rich range of epistemic norms distinct from knowledge. Largely in virtue of this pluralist character, I argue, the Teleological Account is far superior to extant knowledge‐centered accounts.
“… For notable critiques of the Knowledge Account of Assertion, see Weiner (), Lackey (), Brown (), Stanley (), Sosa (), Brown (), and Maitra and Weatherson (). For notable critiques of the Knowledge Account of Action, see Brown (), Neta (), Lackey (), and Gerken (). …”
Here I advance a unified account of the structure of the epistemic normativity of assertion, action, and belief. According to my Teleological Account, all of these are epistemically successful just in case they fulfill the primary aim of knowledgeability, an aim which in turn generates a host of secondary epistemic norms. The central features of the Teleological Account are these: it is compact in its reliance on a single central explanatory posit, knowledge‐centered in its insistence that knowledge sets the fundamental epistemic norm, and yet fiercely pluralistic in its acknowledgment of the legitimacy and value of a rich range of epistemic norms distinct from knowledge. Largely in virtue of this pluralist character, I argue, the Teleological Account is far superior to extant knowledge‐centered accounts.
“…Lackey backs this idea up with thought experiments about so‐called “selfless” assertions, where speakers make assertion in accordance with their evidence but against their beliefs. Also, Ishani Maitra and Brian Weatherson (, p. 112) propose what they call The Evidence Responsiveness Rule , that one should assert that p only if one's attitude towards p is properly responsive to the evidence (they also propose to complement it with an action rule , that it is proper to assert that p only if acting as if p is “the thing for you to do”. )…”
Section: The Variety Of Normsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Others have pointed to the general pragmatic/rhetorical infelicity of (2) as a fact extraneous to norms of assertion, including Douven (, pp. 474–5), Maitra and Weatherson (, p. 110), and Cappelen (, pp. 38–40).…”
Section: Problems With Linguistic Supportmentioning
In this paper I draw attention to a number of problems that afflict norm accounts of assertion, i.e. accounts that explain what assertion is, and typically how speakers understand what assertion is, by appeal to a norm of assertion. I argue that the disagreements in the literature over norm selection undermines such an account of understanding. I also argue that the treatment of intuitions as evidence in the literature undermines much of the connection to empirical evidence. I further argue that appeals made to conversational patterns do not require the existence of any norms at all.
“…… She concludes with … [the proposition that] the thing to do in the circumstances is to go to war. (2010, 101)Maitra and Weatherson claim that in concluding her speech in this way, the Prime Minister of Indalia violates the knowledge rule, yet “she doesn't violate any norms” (2010, 101) governing her speech act. In short, they suggest that this case constitutes a counterexample to the Williamsonian thesis that the knowledge rule is a norm governing every possible assertion.…”
Section: The Master Argument Against the Knowledge Rulementioning
confidence: 99%
“…I am sympathetic to this account of assertion; indeed, there is ample inductive evidence in its favor . In a recent paper, however, Ishani Maitra and Brian Weatherson () argue against the view that assertion is, as they put it, subject toFirst, they provide a direct “Master Argument” (2010, 100) against the thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion; second, they provide two alternative explanations of the linguistic data, which they suggest are preferable to the Williamsonian account.…”
In this paper I compare Timothy Williamson's knowledge rule of assertion with Ishani Maitra and Brian Weatherson's action rule. The paper is in two parts. In the first part I present and respond to Maitra and Weatherson's master argument against the knowledge rule. I argue that while its second premise, to the effect that an action X can be the thing to do though one is in no position to know that it is, is true, its first premise is not: the data do not support the claim that whenever X is the thing for one to do, one is in a position to assert that it is. In the second part I consider Maitra and Weatherson's alternative hypotheses, arguing that they do not provide a better explanation of the linguistic data. I conclude, in particular, that the knowledge rule is preferable to the action rule.
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