Problems with Norms of Assertion

Pagin, Peter

doi:10.1111/phpr.12209

Cited by 52 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 50 publications

(94 reference statements)

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“…Initial responses have questioned whether such studies really indicate a truth effect on epistemic evaluation by suggesting that they do not reflect epistemic requirements but rather requirements concerning what is moral, prudential or polite to assert (Kvanvig ; Pagin ). One thing to note is that this objection does not appear to be fully general since it concerns assertability.…”

Section: The Evidence For a Truth Effect On Epistemic Assessmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Truth‐Sensitivity and Folk Epistemology

Gerken

2018

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Several studies have found a robust effect of truth on epistemic evaluation of belief, decision, action and assertion. Thus, truth has a significant effect on normative participant evaluations. Some theorists take this truth effect to motivate factive epistemic norms of belief, action, assertion etc. In contrast, I argue that the truth effect is best understood as an epistemic instance of the familiar and ubiquitous phenomenon of outcome bias. I support this diagnosis from three interrelating perspectives: (1) by epistemological theorizing, (2) by considerations from cognitive psychology and (3) by methodological reflections on the relationship between folk epistemology and epistemological theorizing.

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Section: The Evidence For a Truth Effect On Epistemic Assessmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Truth‐Sensitivity and Folk Epistemology

Gerken

2018

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…So, even if conditional assertions were allowed some sort of existence, the "all or nothing" status awarded to assertions means that conditional assertions would be treated as "empty". I will not discuss the merits, or otherwise, of these views (for this, see the excellent discussion in [19,28,29]). 16 Rather, I want to point to an alternative account of assertion that coheres much better with the approach to proofs and proving given above.…”

Section: Dynamic Assertionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conditionals in Interaction

Trafford

2017

Studia Humana

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There are several issues with the standard approach to the relationship between conditionals and assertions, particularly when the antecedent of a conditional is (or may be) false. One prominent alternative is to say that conditionals do not express propositions, but rather make conditional assertions that may generate categorical assertions of the consequent in certain circumstances. However, this view has consequences that jar with standard interpretations of the relationship between proofs and assertion. Here, I analyse this relationship, and say that, on at least one understanding of proof, conditional assertions may reflect the dynamics of proving, which (sometimes) generate categorical assertions. In particular, when we think about the relationship between assertion and proof as rooted in a dialogical approach to both, the distinction between conditional and categorical assertions is quite natural.

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“…Similarly, on John Searle's and William Alston's views, languages are constituted by sets of semantic rules which permit uses of expressions in certain conditions (Alston , Searle , for discussion see Harnish ). Finally, on Tim Williamson's influential view assertion is constituted by a pragmatic rule which permits saying that p only if one knows that p (Williamson , , for critical discussion see Cappelen , Maitra , MacFarlane , Pagin , ; for a recent defense, see Goldberg : Ch. 1)…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Constitutive Rules: Games, Language, and Assertion

Reiland

2018

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Many philosophers think that games like chess, languages like English, and speech acts like assertion are constituted by rules. Lots of others disagree. To argue over this productively, it would be first useful to know what it would be for these things to be rule‐constituted. Searle famously claimed in Speech Acts that rules constitute things in the sense that they make possible the performance of actions related to those things (Searle 1969). On this view, rules constitute games, languages, and speech acts in the sense that they make possible playing them, speaking them and performing them. This raises the question what it is to perform rule‐constituted actions (e. g. play, speak, assert) and the question what makes constitutive rules distinctive such that only they make possible the performance of new actions (e. g. playing). In this paper I will criticize Searle's answers to these questions. However, my main aim is to develop a better view, explain how it works in the case of each of games, language, and assertion and illustrate its appeal by showing how it enables rule‐based views of these things to respond to various objections.

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Problems with Norms of Assertion

Cited by 52 publications

References 50 publications

Truth‐Sensitivity and Folk Epistemology

Truth‐Sensitivity and Folk Epistemology

Conditionals in Interaction

Constitutive Rules: Games, Language, and Assertion

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