The Role of the Academic Economist in Litigation Support

Vernarelli, Michael J.

doi:10.5085/jfe.15.1.101

Journal of Forensic Economics

2002

DOI: 10.5085/jfe.15.1.101

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The Role of the Academic Economist in Litigation Support

Michael J. Vernarelli¹

Abstract: No abstract available.

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Cited by 7 publications

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Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts

Cooter

Emons

2004

European Journal of Law and Economics

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Abstract:In trials witnesses often gain by slanting their testimony. The law tries to elicit the truth from witnesses by cross-examination under threat of criminal prosecution for perjury. As a truth-revealing mechanism, perjury law is crude and ineffective. We develop the mathematical form of a perfect truth-revealing mechanism, which exactly offsets the gain from slanted testimony by the risk of a possible sanction. Implementing an effective truthrevealing mechanism requires a witness to certify accuracy by posting bond. If events subsequently prove that the testimony was inaccurate, the witness forfeits the bond. By providing superior incentives for telling the truth, truth-bonding could combat some distortions by factual witnesses and interested experts, including "junk science".

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Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts

Cooter

Emons

2004

European Journal of Law and Economics

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Forensic Economics: An Introduction With Special Emphasis on Price Fixing

Connor

2007

Journal of Competition Law and Economics

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Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts

Cooter¹,

Emons²

2003

JITE

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In trials witnesses often slant their testimony in order to advance their own interests. To obtain truthful testimony, the law relies on cross-examination under threat of prosecution for perjury. We show that perjury law is an imperfect truth-revealing mechanism. More importantly, we develop a perfect truth-revealing mechanism. Under this mechanism the witness is sanctioned if a court eventually finds that the testimony was incorrect; the court need not determine that testimony was dishonest. We explain how truth-revealing mechanisms could combat distortions of observations by factual witnesses and exaggerations by experts, including "junk science." Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, K41, K42.

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The Role of the Academic Economist in Litigation Support

Abstract: No abstract available.

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts

Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts

Forensic Economics: An Introduction With Special Emphasis on Price Fixing

Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts

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