Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts

Abstract

In trials witnesses often slant their testimony in order to advance their own interests. To obtain truthful testimony, the law relies on cross-examination under threat of prosecution for perjury. We show that perjury law is an imperfect truth-revealing mechanism. More importantly, we develop a perfect truth-revealing mechanism. Under this mechanism the witness is sanctioned if a court eventually finds that the testimony was incorrect; the court need not determine that testimony was dishonest. We explain how truth-revealing mechanisms could combat distortions of observations by factual witnesses and exaggerations by experts, including "junk science." Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, K41, K42.

A Disruption Mechanism for Bribes

“…8 Chamberlain (1998) concludes that, on balance, the abuses are not so costly to society as the advantages. 9 Cooter and Emons (2003), Garoupa (1997). If the conditional probability of convicting an offender is higher than that of an innocent for the same expenditure, false accusations can be eliminated or substantially reduced in principle.…”

Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts

“…To illustrate, the German constitutional court ruled that parties should never be liable for statements made in court as long as they themselves perceive their statements to be true. 7 A statute creates a significant exception, however, in antitrust law, where an expert witness who provides misleading testimony for a party in the dispute can be held liable for assisting unfair competition. Furthermore, liability does not require proving that the expert lied.…”

“…28 We define a simple perjury rule as imposing an invariant sanction relative to the probability of its application and the gain 27 (Cooter and Emons 2000). 28 An exposition of this familiar argument from law and economics is in Chapter 11 of (Cooter and Ulen 1999).…”

Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies

“…I have described the dispute for the following reason: Schips' attack in the end resulted in a broad consensus that there is really something to von Ungern-Sternberg's stylized facts. 34 See, e.g., Cooter and Emons [2000] for a mechanism deterring slanted and false expert testimony including`junk science'. imperfect tests and natural insurance monopolies 267…”