The role of robotic modelling in cognitive science

Morse, Anthony F.; Herrera, Carlos; Clowes, Robert W.; Montebelli, Alberto; Ziemke, Tom

doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2011.02.001

Cited by 22 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…This includes both traditional architectures such as SOAR (Laird, Newell & Rosenbloom, 1987), which has its roots in Newell's research, ACT-R (Anderson 2007), which remains influential in psychology, and architectures that strive for neuro-scientific plausibility such as Leabra (O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000) and SPAUN (Eliasmith et al, 2012). Another example of this kind is research on cognitive robotic architectures as unifying cognition (Morse et al, 2011). Thus, to study developmental processes, one may use one of the robotic platforms of so-called epigenetic robotics, such as i-Cub (Metta et al, 2010).…”

Section: Two Popular Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One could reply that this is because explanatory models are in some way special, i.e., they need not be unified to be satisfying, whereas there are some models, in particular physical ones, that stand in need of genuine unification. This is the kind of argument that was put forward by proponents of robotic architectures of cognition (Morse et al, 2011): To make a cognitive robot work, one needs a unified and complete model of its cognitive capacities. But this argument is not valid.…”

Section: Unification Strategies In Cognitive Sciencementioning

confidence: 99%

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Unification Strategies in Cognitive Science

Miłkowski

2016

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric

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Abstract.Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary conglomerate of various research fields and disciplines, which increases the risk of fragmentation of cognitive theories. However, while most previous work has focused on theoretical integration, some kinds of integration may turn out to be monstrous, or result in superficially lumped and unrelated bodies of knowledge. In this paper, I distinguish theoretical integration from theoretical unification, and propose some analyses of theoretical unification dimensions. Moreover, two research strategies that are supposed to lead to unification are analyzed in terms of the mechanistic account of explanation. Finally, I argue that theoretical unification is not an absolute requirement from the mechanistic perspective, and that strategies aiming at unification may be premature in fields where there are multiple conflicting explanatory models.

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Section: Two Popular Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Unification Strategies In Cognitive Sciencementioning

confidence: 99%

Unification Strategies in Cognitive Science

Miłkowski

2016

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric

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“…Robotics makes clear the evolutionary feat that is biological intelligence [ 1 – 4 ]. Smooth and effective action in a constantly changing physical world requires the continuous coupling of sensors and effectors to those changing physical realities [ 2 , 5 – 8 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Posture Affects How Robots and Infants Map Words to Objects

et al. 2015

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For infants, the first problem in learning a word is to map the word to its referent; a second problem is to remember that mapping when the word and/or referent are again encountered. Recent infant studies suggest that spatial location plays a key role in how infants solve both problems. Here we provide a new theoretical model and new empirical evidence on how the body – and its momentary posture – may be central to these processes. The present study uses a name-object mapping task in which names are either encountered in the absence of their target (experiments 1–3, 6 & 7), or when their target is present but in a location previously associated with a foil (experiments 4, 5, 8 & 9). A humanoid robot model (experiments 1–5) is used to instantiate and test the hypothesis that body-centric spatial location, and thus the bodies’ momentary posture, is used to centrally bind the multimodal features of heard names and visual objects. The robot model is shown to replicate existing infant data and then to generate novel predictions, which are tested in new infant studies (experiments 6–9). Despite spatial location being task-irrelevant in this second set of experiments, infants use body-centric spatial contingency over temporal contingency to map the name to object. Both infants and the robot remember the name-object mapping even in new spatial locations. However, the robot model shows how this memory can emerge –not from separating bodily information from the word-object mapping as proposed in previous models of the role of space in word-object mapping – but through the body’s momentary disposition in space.

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“…and Ezequiel Di Paolo, who have been working on developing the insights from physiology and 592 neuroscience outlined in section 2 and modelling these in robotic agents, is changing this, 593 however, and robotic modelling is beginning to integrate processes beyond sensorimotor 594 interaction (see Morse et al 2011). The move towards more biologically plausible robotics, a robotics which is not only 601 sensorimotor and superficially autonomous but which is interoceptive and provides a way to be 602 deeply autonomous, is a step towards an affective robotics, and thus a step towards a cognitive 603 science which is not merely embodied in terms of its sensorimotor possibilities but "properly 604 embodied".…”

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confidence: 99%

Steps to a “Properly Embodied” cognitive science

Stapleton

2013

Cognitive Systems Research

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8Cognitive systems research has predominantly been guided by the historical distinction between 9 emotion and cognition, and has focused its efforts on modelling the "cognitive" aspects of 10 behaviour. While this initially meant modelling only the control system of cognitive creatures, 11with the advent of "embodied" cognitive science this expanded to also modelling the interactions 12 between the control system and the external environment. What did not seem to change with this 13 embodiment revolution, however, was the attitude towards affect and emotion in cognitive 14science. This paper argues that cognitive systems research is now beginning to integrate these 15 aspects of natural cognitive systems into cognitive science proper, not in virtue of traditional 16 "embodied cognitive science", which focuses predominantly on the body's gross morphology, 17 but rather in virtue of research into the interoceptive, organismic basis of natural cognitive 18 systems. 19 20

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The role of robotic modelling in cognitive science

Cited by 22 publications

References 14 publications

Unification Strategies in Cognitive Science

Unification Strategies in Cognitive Science

Posture Affects How Robots and Infants Map Words to Objects

Steps to a “Properly Embodied” cognitive science

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