Unification Strategies in Cognitive Science

Miłkowski, Marcin

doi:10.1515/slgr-2016-0053

Cited by 25 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 66 publications

(44 reference statements)

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“…Second, FEP itself seems to bring heavy unificatory power of its own. One of the hallmarks of unified explanations is that they have a large, preferably unbounded scope (Kitcher, 1989; Miłkowski, 2016). By conceptual necessity, FEP generalizes over all living (self-organizing, adaptive) systems.…”

Section: Free Energy Principle and The Predictive Mind’s Unificatory mentioning

confidence: 99%

Mechanistic unity of the predictive mind

Gładziejewski

2019

Theory & Psychology

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It has recently been argued that cognitive scientists should embrace explanatory pluralism rather than pursue the search for a unificatory framework or theory. This stance dovetails with the mechanistic view of cognitive-scientific explanation. However, one recently proposed theory—based on an idea that the brain is a predictive engine—opposes pluralism with its unificatory ambitions. My aim here is to investigate those pretentions to elucidate what sort of unification is on offer. I challenge the idea that explanatory unification of cognitive science follows from the Free Energy Principle. I claim that if the predictive story is to provide a unification, it is by proposing that many distinct cognitive mechanisms fall under a single prediction-error-minimization schema. I also argue that even though unification is not an absolute evaluative criterion for mechanistic explanations, it may play an epistemic role in evaluating the relative credibility of an explanation.

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Section: Free Energy Principle and The Predictive Mind’s Unificatory mentioning

confidence: 99%

Mechanistic unity of the predictive mind

Gładziejewski

2019

Theory & Psychology

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“…To do this, we assume the new mechanistic approach to explanation, which will make our task at the same time easy and rather novel, as unity is rarely seen as a mechanistic virtue (Craver 2007; but see Miłkowski 2016a). According to the new mechanistic approach, to explain phenomenon P constitutively is to describe a mechanism responsible for P (Craver 2007;Glennan 2017;Machamer et al 2000).…”

Section: A New Perspective On Unification In Ecmentioning

confidence: 99%

Representational unification in cognitive science: Is embodied cognition a unifying perspective?

Miłkowski

Nowakowski

2019

Synthese

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In this paper, we defend a novel, multidimensional account of representational unification, which we distinguish from integration. The dimensions of unity are simplicity, generality and scope, non-monstrosity, and systematization. In our account, unification is a graded property. The account is used to investigate the issue of how research traditions contribute to representational unification, focusing on embodied cognition in cognitive science. Embodied cognition contributes to unification even if it fails to offer a grand unification of cognitive science. The study of this failure shows that unification, contrary to what defenders of mechanistic explanation claim, is an important mechanistic virtue of research traditions.

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“…[Although I would interchangeably say that a MUM unifies or that it integrates existing accounts, one could draw a distinction between unification and integration. Miłkowski (2016) , for instance, characterizes explanatory unification as the project of finding general and simple explanations, whereas explanatory integration combines existing explanations. The project of developing a MUM aims at explanatory unification, not integration.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A related approach is advertised by Graziano et al (2019 , 15), who argue that “[w]e may now have a […] family of theories that cohere and provide a working, mechanistic, scientifically meaningful, and even artificially buildable understanding of consciousness.” According to the authors, their own theory (attention schema theory, AST) “can be understood as a specific unification of GW [global workspace theory] and HOT [higher-order thought theory]” (2019, 13). The posits of AST overlap with other theories, and hence may provide a means of combining existing theories—however, this would amount to explanatory integration, not explanatory unification (in the sense of Miłkowski 2016 ). By contrast, a MUM seeks to abstract away from the dispensable parts of existing accounts, thereby offering a way of replacing existing theories (at least ideally).]…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying model

Wiese

2020

Neuroscience of Consciousness

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Abstract This article discusses a hypothesis recently put forward by Kanai et al., according to which information generation constitutes a functional basis of, and a sufficient condition for, consciousness. Information generation involves the ability to compress and subsequently decompress information, potentially after a temporal delay and adapted to current purposes. I will argue that information generation should not be regarded as a sufficient condition for consciousness, but could serve as what I will call a “minimal unifying model of consciousness.” A minimal unifying model (MUM) specifies at least one necessary feature of consciousness, characterizes it in a determinable way, and shows that it is entailed by (many) existing theories of consciousness. Information generation fulfills these requirements. A MUM of consciousness is useful, because it unifies existing theories of consciousness by highlighting their common assumptions, while enabling further developments from which empirical predictions can be derived. Unlike existing theories (which probably contain at least some false assumptions), a MUM is thus likely to be an adequate model of consciousness, albeit at a relatively general level. Assumptions embodied in such a model are less informative than assumptions made by more specific theories and hence function more in the way of guiding principles. Still, they enable further refinements, in line with new empirical results and broader theoretical and evolutionary considerations. This also allows developing the model in ways that facilitate more specific claims and predictions.

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Unification Strategies in Cognitive Science

Cited by 25 publications

References 66 publications

Mechanistic unity of the predictive mind

Mechanistic unity of the predictive mind

Representational unification in cognitive science: Is embodied cognition a unifying perspective?

The science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying model

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