Representational unification in cognitive science: Is embodied cognition a unifying perspective?

Abstract

In this paper, we defend a novel, multidimensional account of representational unification, which we distinguish from integration. The dimensions of unity are simplicity, generality and scope, non-monstrosity, and systematization. In our account, unification is a graded property. The account is used to investigate the issue of how research traditions contribute to representational unification, focusing on embodied cognition in cognitive science. Embodied cognition contributes to unification even if it fails to offer a grand unification of cognitive science. The study of this failure shows that unification, contrary to what defenders of mechanistic explanation claim, is an important mechanistic virtue of research traditions.

A Model Solution: On the Compatibility of Predictive Processing and Embodied Cognition

“…19 I am also not alone in this position. Michel (2022), for instance, suggests that PP is a "cognitive computational paradigm that is only just emerging and still under construction" (original emphasis) (p.5); while Miłkowski and Nowakowski (2021) suggest that, "EC should be understood as composed of multiple, and sometimes quite extensive, component research subtraditions" (p. S71). However, while landing on the same core idea these accounts differ from the current one with respect to their target of analysis.…”

“…However, while landing on the same core idea these accounts differ from the current one with respect to their target of analysis. Michel (2022), for instance, is concerned with articulating the theoretical status of PP in order to better understand the language of thought hypothesis, while Miłkowski and Nowakowski (2021) are concerned with the status of EC 18 A similar point holds of EC. See Miłkowski and Nowakowski (2021) for discussion.…”

“…Michel (2022), for instance, is concerned with articulating the theoretical status of PP in order to better understand the language of thought hypothesis, while Miłkowski and Nowakowski (2021) are concerned with the status of EC 18 A similar point holds of EC. See Miłkowski and Nowakowski (2021) for discussion. 19 One interesting point to note is that when a specific theory is abstracted from its historical context this can produce ambiguous clues as to its research tradition (or traditions) (Laudan, 1977, p. 99).…”

“…While individual EC theories, such as those about word frequency effect, are empirically falsifiable, in virtue of making specific experimental predictions, research traditions, by their nature, are not testable. For example, as Miłkowski and Nowakowski (2021) point out, computationalism, like EC, is not a single theory but, rather, a varied tradition, one methodologically committed to computational modelling and ontologically committed to claims about physical computation in cognitive systems. It does not make detailed predictions about specific phenomenon such as the word frequency effect.…”

Restricting movements of lower face leaves recognition of emotional vocalizations intact but introduces a valence positivity bias

“…Although the scope of the embodiment [33][34][35][36][37][38] , and its methodological commitments [39][40][41][42] are under extensive discussion, numerous researchers in the field agree that at least some aspects of conceptual understanding rely on a mechanism of simulation 26,27,43 . These simulations involve reenactments of sensorimotor and somatosensory networks of the brain that are primarily active during physical interactions with exemplars of a given category.…”