Steps to a “Properly Embodied” cognitive science

Abstract

8Cognitive systems research has predominantly been guided by the historical distinction between 9 emotion and cognition, and has focused its efforts on modelling the "cognitive" aspects of 10 behaviour. While this initially meant modelling only the control system of cognitive creatures, 11with the advent of "embodied" cognitive science this expanded to also modelling the interactions 12 between the control system and the external environment. What did not seem to change with this 13 embodiment revolution, however, was the attitude towards affect and emotion in cognitive 14science. This paper argues that cognitive systems research is now beginning to integrate these 15 aspects of natural cognitive systems into cognitive science proper, not in virtue of traditional 16 "embodied cognitive science", which focuses predominantly on the body's gross morphology, 17 but rather in virtue of research into the interoceptive, organismic basis of natural cognitive 18 systems. 19 20

Aesthetics as an Emotional Activity That Facilitates Sense-Making: Towards an Enactive Approach to Aesthetic Experience

“…Therefore, by the term 'aesthetic pleasure', we refer to emotional reactions with positive values, which are associated with a positively valued anticipation of the plans (provision and selection of actions with the environment) of the agent, with respect to the fulfillment of its goals. In contrast, by the term 'aesthetic pain', we refer to those emotional reactions characterized by a negative value, which emerge when the agent anticipates problems with its plans for the fulfillment of its goals , 2013.…”

“…As Pessoa argues, the circuit (OFC-ACC-amygdala-OFC) indicates that the processing related to the cost/benefit analysis of the potential implications that the current interactive state will have for the agent, is emotional or affective. Each time the agent uses these processing circuits, better predictions are being made, and the perception of the object is getting less and less uncertain, while at the same time the agent enacts more and more functional meanings (Stapleton 2013).…”

Constitution Embodiment

“…As I show in section 2.1, constitution embodiment has become popular again due to the work of Enactivists (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991;Noë, 2004Noë, , 2012Thompson, 2007;Thompson & Stapleton, 2009;Stapleton, 2013) and proponents of Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, henceforth RECS (Chemero, 2009;Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014). But, as I suggest, constitution embodiment should be also of interest to all other proponents of phenomenologically inspired Embodied Cognition (henceforth PEC); particularly to those who have in their writing stressed the importance of Husserl's concept of "Leib," or Merleau-Ponty's concept of "body schema."…”

“…They rather have to show how Merleau-Ponty was conceptually justified in blurring the boundary, either by reconstructing the conceptual argument that Merleau-Ponty gave (if there is any such) and by demonstrating that it is conceptually consistent, or by proving a conceptual argument of their own that applies at least to their work and would justify how they can blur the boundary between the transcendental and the psychological. Thomp son, 2008;Kiverstein, 2012;Stapleton, 2013;Colombetti, 2014;Kiverstein & Miller, 2015). Only a psychological conception of affect determines the effort that is necessary to perform an action (Bower & Gallagher, 2013).…”

“…Only a psychological conception of affect determines the effort that is necessary to perform an action (Bower & Gallagher, 2013). Only a psychological conception of affect pertains to direct relevance detection, motivation or the guidance of attention (Stapleton, 2013;Colombetti, 2014;Kiverstein & Miller, 2015). All these aspects of affect are psychological, and in a certain sense, trivially embodied.…”