The role of envy in ultimatum games

Kirchsteiger, Georg

doi:10.1016/0167-2681(94)90106-6

Cited by 200 publications

(138 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Although some models have focused on prosocial motives, such as a preference for "fairness" or an aversion to inequity (8,9), other work has found no link between rejections in the ultimatum game and prosocial behavior in other games (10). This suggests that humans' tendency to reject low offers in the ultimatum game may stem from other sources, such as spite (11,12), culture (3,13), and generalized forms of social learning (14,15).…”

mentioning

confidence: 81%

The role of self-interest in elite bargaining

LeVeck

Hughes

Fowler

et al. 2014

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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One of the best-known and most replicated laboratory results in behavioral economics is that bargainers frequently reject low offers, even when it harms their material self-interest. This finding could have important implications for international negotiations on many problems facing humanity today, because models of international bargaining assume exactly the opposite: that policy makers are rational and self-interested. However, it is unknown whether elites who engage in diplomatic bargaining will similarly reject low offers because past research has been based almost exclusively on convenience samples of undergraduates, members of the general public, or small-scale societies rather than highly experienced elites who design and bargain over policy. Using a unique sample of 102 policy and business elites who have an average of 21 y of practical experience conducting international diplomacy or policy strategy, we show that, compared with undergraduates and the general public, elites are actually more likely to reject low offers when playing a standard "ultimatum game" that assesses how players bargain over a fixed resource. Elites with more experience tend to make even higher demands, suggesting that this tendency only increases as policy makers advance to leadership positions. This result contradicts assumptions of rational self-interested behavior that are standard in models of international bargaining, and it suggests that the adoption of global agreements on international trade, climate change, and other important problems will not depend solely on the interests of individual countries, but also on whether these accords are seen as equitable to all member states.self-interest | bargaining | elites | ultimatum game | game theory

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confidence: 81%

The role of self-interest in elite bargaining

LeVeck

Hughes

Fowler

et al. 2014

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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“…22 22 Let us consider a bargaining game between player i and player j. Models of fairness can be classified as: 1) Model of Altruism (Andreoni and Miller, 2002;Charness and Rabin, 2002) : the utility function of player i is increasing in the payoff of player j ; 2) Model of Relative income and Envy (Bolton, 1991, Kirchsteiger 1994: the first partial derivative of utility function of player i with respect to the ratio of i's payoff to j's payoff is strictly positive when the payoff of player j is inferior to the player i's one and zero otherwise ; 3) Model of Inequity Aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999 ;Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000): player is altruistic towards other players if their payoff are below an equitable benchmark, but she feels envy when the payoff of the other player…”

Section: Theoretical Framework Generalitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interpersonal comparisons of utility in bargaining: evidence from a transcontinental ultimatum game

2009

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“…In particular, empirical evidence suggests that, in many contexts, subjects care about efficiency and/or inequality (see, among many others, Kirchsteiger 1994, Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Charness and Rabin 2002. In our setup, if a player is sufficiently inequality-averse, his preferences over the money distribution might differ from the one induced by self-centered preferences.…”

Section: Behavioral Predictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

(When and how) do voters try to manipulate?

Kube

Puppe

2008

Public Choice

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We study strategic voting in a laboratory experiment using a Borda mechanism. We find that manipulation rates are surprisingly low, even for individuals who know that they possess superior information about the other agents' preferences. Exploring possible explanations, we find that manipulation rates rise significantly if individuals are not only informed about the other agents' preferences but also about their actual votes. This suggests that uncertainty plays a key role in understanding strategic behavior in elections. By contrast, distributional concerns, e.g., in the form of inequality aversion, are found to play a negligible role in our context.

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The role of envy in ultimatum games

Cited by 200 publications

References 7 publications

The role of self-interest in elite bargaining

The role of self-interest in elite bargaining

Interpersonal comparisons of utility in bargaining: evidence from a transcontinental ultimatum game

(When and how) do voters try to manipulate?

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