(When and how) do voters try to manipulate?

Kube, Sebastian; Puppe, Clemens

doi:10.1007/s11127-008-9376-9

Cited by 24 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…This study adds to a growing field of literature that uses experiments to investigate political questions (e.g., Bolsen, Ferraro, & Miranda, ; Grosser & Schram, ; Kube & Puppe, ). A part of this literature focuses on institutions; for example, Hamman, Weber, and Woon () find that democratic elections in a public good game allow for selection of prosocial leaders who make higher contributions.…”

Section: Experimental Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Experimental Investigation of Election Promises

Born

Eck

Johannesson

2017

Political Psychology

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We analyze the effect of election promises on electoral behavior in a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, politicians can make nonbinding election promises about how to split an endowment between themselves and the group. We find that promises affect both voting and voter beliefs about how much the politician will contribute to the public fund. The relationship is inverted U‐shaped with decreasing credibility of higher promises. Contributions of politicians are correlated with their promises in a similar pattern. The election promises are generally credible unless particularly high. Politicians keep promises more often if a reelection is possible and if the politician came into power by vote rather than by random draw. Voters reward high contributions in the previous period and punish promise breaking even after controlling for the contribution in the previous period or voters' beliefs about future contributions. By controlling for voters' beliefs, we distinguish retrospective from prospective voting. Our results suggest that voters both use promises for prospective voting and retrospectively punish broken promises.

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Section: Experimental Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Experimental Investigation of Election Promises

Born

Eck

Johannesson

2017

Political Psychology

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“…Kube and Puppe [35] studied strategic voting behavior under the Borda rule. They found a positive relationship between the amount of information that was provided to subjects about others and their propensity to manipulate: subjects were significantly more likely to engage in strategic behavior when they are informed about others' preferences, and even more so when subjects were provided information about others' actual votes.…”

Section: Lab Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic voting in the lab: compromise and leader bias behavior

Meir

Gal

Tal

2020

Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst

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Plurality voting is perhaps the most commonly used way to aggregate the preferences of multiple voters. Yet, there is no consensus on how people vote strategically, even in very simple settings. The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive study of people's voting behavior in various online settings under the plurality rule. We implemented voting games that replicate two common real-world voting scenarios in controlled experiments. In the first, a single voter votes once after seeing a pre-election poll. In the second game, a group of voters play an iterative game, and change their vote as the game progresses (as in online voting). The winning candidate in each game (and hence the subject's payment) is determined using the plurality rule. For each of these settings we generated hundreds of game instances, varying conditions such as the number of voters, subjects' preferences over candidates and the poll information that was made available to the subjects prior to voting. We show that people can be classified into several groups, one of which is not engaged in any strategic behavior, while the largest group demonstrates both a tendency for strategic compromise, and a bias toward voting for the leader in the poll. We provide a detailed analysis of this group behavior for both settings, and how it depends on the poll information. Our study has insight for multi-agent system designers in uncovering patterns that provide reasonable predictions of voters' behaviors, which may facilitate the design of agents that support people or act autonomously in voting systems.

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“…As a variant of the Borda voting rule, Borda maximin violates the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) which holds that the social ranking of two candidates (contract proposals) should not be influenced by the placement of other candidates in the ballots (offspring OFF) of the voting agents [43,56]. As a consequence of this the effectiveness of ES-CM to achieve a high solution quality can be decreased.…”

Section: Voting-based Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A generic coordination mechanism for lot-sizing in supply chains

Homberger

2010

Electron Commer Res

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A new generic mechanism to coordinate decentral planning of a group of independent and self-interested decision makers, who are searching for an agreeable contract regarding multiple interdependent issues, in the case of asymmetric information is presented. The basic idea of the mechanism is that the group members cooperatively carry out an evolutionary search in the contract space. Therefore the (1, λ)-selection procedure, which is used in many evolutionary strategies, is combined with the Borda maximin voting rule, which has been applied successfully in group decision making. The proposed mechanism is realized, applied and evaluated for production coordination in a supply chain. A decentralized variant of the multilevel uncapacitated lot-sizing problem (MLULSP) is taken as the production model. For the evaluation 95 problem instances are generated based on MLULSP instances taken from the literature, with problem sizes varying from 5 to 500 items, from 12 to 52 periods. Experimental results show that the proposed mechanism is effective to determine fair cost distributions.

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(When and how) do voters try to manipulate?

Cited by 24 publications

References 22 publications

An Experimental Investigation of Election Promises

An Experimental Investigation of Election Promises

Strategic voting in the lab: compromise and leader bias behavior

A generic coordination mechanism for lot-sizing in supply chains

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