Interpersonal comparisons of utility in bargaining: evidence from a transcontinental ultimatum game

Boarini, Romina; Laslier, Jean‐François; Robin, Stéphane

doi:10.1007/s11238-009-9135-5

Cited by 25 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 14 publications

(14 reference statements)

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“…Human groups exhibiting a low propensity to cooperate in the ultimatum game should as well select low rejection rates. Such sensitivity is indeed observed in laboratory experiments, see for instance the comparison between Indian and French participants (Boarini et al, 2004). Figure 2 and figure 3 compare the theoretical and experimental rejection rates in ultimatum games involving French and Indian participants (Boarini et al, 2004).…”

Section: -The Ultimatum Gamesupporting

confidence: 56%

“…Experimental observations on French participants are well anticipated by the theory while one can observe significant discrepancies between theory and data for Indian participants. Interestingly, this discrepancy comes with another important difference between French and Indian behaviors, as reported by Boarini, Laslier and Robin (2004). Indeed, while French's offers remain constant over repetition of the game, suggesting that the appropriate level of punishment leads to a stable collective feedback process, Indians' offers continuously decrease over time as the games are repeated.…”

Section: -The Ultimatum Gamementioning

confidence: 98%

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Quantitative determination of the level of cooperation in the presence of punishment in three public good experiments

Darcet

Sornette

2008

J Econ Interact Coord

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Strong reciprocity is a fundamental human characteristic associated with our extraordinary sociality and cooperation. Laboratory experiments on social dilemma games and many field studies have quantified well-defined levels of cooperation and propensity to punish/reward. The level of cooperation is observed to be strongly dependent on the availability of punishments and/or rewards. Here, we propose an operational approach based on the evolutionary selection of prosocial behaviors to explain the quantitative level of the propensity to punish in three experimental set-ups. A simple cost/benefit analysis at the level of a single agent, who anticipates the action of her fellows, determines an optimal level of altruistic punishment, which explains quantitatively experimental results on a third-party punishment game, the ultimatum game and an altruistic punishment game. We also report numerical simulations of an evolutionary agent-based model of repeated agent interactions with feedback by punishments, which confirms that the propensity to punish is a robust emergent property selected by the evolutionary rules of the model. The cost-benefit reasoning is not to be taken literally but rather to embody the result of the selection pressure of coevolving agents that have make them converge to their preferences (which can be seen as either hard-wired and/or culturally selected). In this view, the prosocial preference of humans is a collective emergent process, robustly selected by adaptation and selection. Our main contribution is to use evolutionary feedback selection to quantify the value of the prosocial propensity to punish, and test this prediction on three different experimental set-ups.

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Section: -The Ultimatum Gamesupporting

confidence: 56%

Section: -The Ultimatum Gamementioning

confidence: 98%

Quantitative determination of the level of cooperation in the presence of punishment in three public good experiments

Darcet

Sornette

2008

J Econ Interact Coord

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“…The proposed utility function indicates the amount of traffic carried by the RANs with respect to the actual traffic demand from it. Following the concept of local equity [8], we have considered maximizing equality of distribution (MED) to be objective of the WSP. In this objective, the spectrum is distributed in a way such that equal amount of utilities are allocated to the RANs.…”

Section: Our Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simulated annealing based solution for limited spectrum availability in composite wireless network

Sengupta

Paul

Maitra

2014

2014 International Conference on Advances in Computing, Communications and Informatics (ICACCI)

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Requirement of multiple services from the customers has compelled the wireless service providers (WSPs) to maintain multiple radio access networks (RANs) of different radio access technologies (RATs). Further, dynamic spectrum allocation (DSA) approach offers a great opportunity to the WSPs to utilize their available spectrum in more efficient manner. As the growth of demand for wireless services is expected to continue unabated, the WSPs may also face a scenario in which, spectrum demands from the RANs is more than the availability of spectrum with the WSP.In this work, we have addressed this limited spectrum availability scenario in the composite wireless network (CWN) considering realistic constraints such as different propagation characteristics of channels at different spectrum region and discrete channelizations of the RANs. The problem has been posed as a bankruptcy game and Shapley value solution of the game has been computed. For maintaining the fairness of spectrum allocation, maximizing equality of distribution (MED) is considered to be the objective of the WSPs. Subsequently, we have proposed simulated annealing (SA) based spectrum allocation solution that would maximize the objective. Our simulation result shows that the SA based solution outperforms existing solutions such as Shapley value and max-min fairness by wide margin as far as objective MED in concerned.

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“…Ein ähnliches Begriffsverständnis von Equity liegt vor, wenn damit die Gleichheit des Verhältnisses zwischen dem Endgewinn und dem Input von A und dem Verhältnis zwischen dem Endgewinn und dem Input von B bezeichnet wird. Auch die Gleichheit der Verhältnisse zwischen dem Endgewinn und der Anfangsausstattung beider Akteure ist eine Form von Equity (Boarini et al 2006;Yaari u. Bar-Hillel 1984). Messick (1993, S. 24) argumentiert, Equity sei das am besten "socially defensible allocation principle."…”

Section: Aversion Gegen Distributive Ungleichheit (Equity-prinzip)unclassified

“…B. für die Messung des Verhaltens im Fall eines sozialen Dilemmas: Jackson 2001, für die Messung von Verhaltensabsichten: Hedinger u. Götte 2006). Ein dieser Thematik zuzuordnendes Experiment, in welchem unter den sonstigen hier getroffenen Annahmen bisher "am ehesten" mehr oder minder unterschiedliche Personen zu Spielerpaaren kombiniert wurden, stammt von Boarini et al (2006). Diese Autoren bildeten 108 Personenpaare, bestehend aus Franzosen und Indern, die sie im Jahr 2002 per Internet im Ultimatum Game interagieren ließen.…”

Section: Ableitung Der Hypothesenunclassified

Wie reagieren Personen in einer reziproken Situation?

Gierl

Yang

2010

markt

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Interpersonal comparisons of utility in bargaining: evidence from a transcontinental ultimatum game

Cited by 25 publications

References 14 publications

Quantitative determination of the level of cooperation in the presence of punishment in three public good experiments

Quantitative determination of the level of cooperation in the presence of punishment in three public good experiments

Simulated annealing based solution for limited spectrum availability in composite wireless network

Wie reagieren Personen in einer reziproken Situation?

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