2015
DOI: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2015.11.494
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The Remuneration Determinants of Chief Executive Officers: A Theoretical Approach

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Cited by 6 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…However, this interpretation may be misleading: they see a joint CEO-Chair as essentially a powerful CEO with the incentives agency theory would suggest (to protect insiders by lowering risk). This is at odds with literature we cite above (Šilingienė et al, 2015, Goh and Gupta, 2016and Dey et al, 2011 showing that, in the UK, CEO remuneration structures incentivise risk-taking much more than the remuneration structures of Chairmen, and that joint CEO-Chairmen have especially high pay-based incentives to take risk.…”
Section: J O U R N a L P R E -P R O O Fmentioning
confidence: 61%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…However, this interpretation may be misleading: they see a joint CEO-Chair as essentially a powerful CEO with the incentives agency theory would suggest (to protect insiders by lowering risk). This is at odds with literature we cite above (Šilingienė et al, 2015, Goh and Gupta, 2016and Dey et al, 2011 showing that, in the UK, CEO remuneration structures incentivise risk-taking much more than the remuneration structures of Chairmen, and that joint CEO-Chairmen have especially high pay-based incentives to take risk.…”
Section: J O U R N a L P R E -P R O O Fmentioning
confidence: 61%
“…These empirical results would be surprising if we based our thinking entirely on agency theory, with its focus on differing personal incentives, and believed, as regulators appear to, that the most important feature of independent Chairmen (aside from basic competence) is the fact that they have weaker paybased incentives than CEOs to pursue profit and take risk. Literature we cite in Section 2 shows that regulators are correct to believe that UK bank CEOs, and especially Joint CEO-Chairmen, have strong pay-based incentives to take risk whereas independent Chairmen lack such incentives (Šilingienė et al, 2015, Goh and Gupta, 2016and Dey et al, 2011.…”
Section: Effects Of a Joint Ceo-chairmanmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is reflected between the submission requirements, the result of management control system and the organization internal control mechanism, which will then become a part of organization report to external parties.The submission requirements will induce the change in management control system that underlies the improved organization accountability (Sopp and Baumuller, 2012). After an organization carries out the allocation of performance allowance, there should be a special committee of performance allowance which is to provide input and analysis related to its culture, standard and financial potential that exist in it (Silingiene et al, 2015).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The following illustrates how wages and salaries are defined differently:In accordance with Soem arso, the definition of wages is compensation for employees who perform manual labor and rely more heavily on their physical prowess. Theamount is typically cal culated on a daily, unit, or wholesale basis (Krumbiegel et al, 2018;Martins & Saraiva, 2020;Šilingienė et al, 2015).…”
Section: Wages and Related Legal Aspectsremunerationmentioning
confidence: 99%