The Relevance of Politically Relevant Dyads

Lemke, Douglas; Reed, William L.

doi:10.1177/0022002701045001006

Cited by 172 publications

(110 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…Our results do not contradict these findings, but they do suggest the need to think further about sample selection and control variables. Lemke and Reed (2001) recently showed that although the focus on politically rele vant dyads may introduce some selection bias, it does not substantively affect the sta tistical estimates. Nonetheless, enlarging the sample to include all dyads with avail able data, thus including more distended state pairs, does weaken the estimated inverse relationship between trade and war as Oneal and Russett (1999, 431) show.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic Geography, Trade, and War

Bearce¹,

Fisher

2002

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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An agent-based model in which economic exchange and military conflict are emergent processes is used to explore the relationship between trade and war. The model of exchange is an applied analysis of the economics of trading networks. The model of conflict treats war as a breakdown in interstate bargaining due to incomplete information. The simulations explore how initial economic geography, state revisionism, defensive advantage, and technological advancement akin to globalization affect both trade and war. The results show that the relationship between trade and war depends on third factors, and an inverse relationship between trade and war emerges from compact geographies with revisionist states.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic Geography, Trade, and War

Bearce¹,

Fisher

2002

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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“…Directed dyads are ordered pairs of states in which state A is the potential initiator and state B is the potential target. To eliminate dyads that have no opportunity for conflict, I restrict my analysis to "politically relevant" dyads (Lemke and Reed 2001), defined as pairs of states that are contiguous and/or include at least one major power. Out of over one million total directed dyad-years between 1945 and 2001, this restriction leaves 116,174 observations.…”

Section: Data and Measurementmentioning

confidence: 99%

War and Revenge: Explaining Conflict Initiation by Democracies

Stein

2015

Am Polit Sci Rev

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W hile we know much about what differentiates the conflict behavior of democracies from autocracies, we know relatively little about why some democracies are more belligerent than others. In contrast to existing studies, I argue that it is public opinion and not institutions that drives these differences. All democratic leaders have an incentive to take public opinion into account, but public opinion is not the same everywhere. Individuals' attitudes towards war are shaped by core beliefs about revenge, which vary across countries. Leaders with more vengeful populations will be more likely to initiate conflicts because they generate popular support for war more effectively. Using retention of capital punishment as a proxy for broad endorsement of revenge, I find that democracies that have retained the death penalty for longer periods of time are significantly more likely to initiate conflicts. This research has important implications for existing theories of democracy and war.

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“…In our first specification, following prior research designs, we restrict the study to politically relevant dyads (Lemke and Reed, 2001).…”

Section: Empirical Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

How Uncertainty about War Outcomes Affects War Onset

Bas

Schub

2016

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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In canonical accounts of war, conflict outcomes are inherently uncertain. Contesting literatures posit that this uncertainty, arising from stochastic elements of the war-fighting process, may induce conflict due to greater risks of miscalculation or foster peace by breeding caution. We theorize that states, on average, exhibit prudence when confronting greater uncertainty. Despite its conceptual importance, extant proxies for uncertainty at various levels of analysissuch as polarity, balance-of-power, system concentration, and dyadic relative capabilitiesare imprecise and theoretically inappropriate indicators. To overcome this shortcoming, we theorize the conditions that elevate the magnitude of uncertainty over conflict outcomes and introduce a novel measure that captures this uncertainty within any k-state system. Through extensive empirical analysis, we confirm uncertainty's pacifying effect, and show how this effect operates at different levels of analysis.

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The Relevance of Politically Relevant Dyads

Cited by 172 publications

References 36 publications

Economic Geography, Trade, and War

Economic Geography, Trade, and War

War and Revenge: Explaining Conflict Initiation by Democracies

How Uncertainty about War Outcomes Affects War Onset

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