No abstract

Ultimatum bargaining models of international interactions suggest that when conflict is costly and the actors are fully informed, the probability of conflict goes to zero. However, conflict occurs with some positive probability when the challenger is uncertain about the defender's reservation value. I employ a simple ultimatum game of bargaining to evaluate two traditional power-centric theories of world politics, balance of power, and power transition theory. The formal and empirical analyses demonstrate that as states approach power parity, information asymmetries are greatest, thus enhancing the probability of militarized conflict. Uncertainty is a central cause of conflict emergence and is correlated with the distribution of observable capabilities. Recognizing the relationship between the distribution of power and the uncertainty offers a more sophisticated interpretation of power-centric explanations of world politics.

Relevant dyads are pairs of contiguous states or pairs of states including at least one major power. They are argued to be the population of dyads at risk of international conflict and are increasingly commonly used as the cases analyzed by conflict researchers. Does reliance on relevant dyads (a nonrandom sample of all dyads) introduce threats to valid inference? The authors argue that relevant dyad usage might introduce related problems of measurement error and selection bias and investigate whether there is evidence of such potential problems existing in actual relevant dyad data sets. Results show evidence for both types of potential problems, but neither problem substantively affects estimates of conflict relationships. Therefore, relevant dyad usage is not especially objectionable due to either of these problems, and retrospective sampling might be an even more profitable course for future research.

A tremendous amount of attention is paid to whether or not joint democracy precludes wars within dyads. Although there now seems to be some measure of consensus that democracies rarely or never fight one another, the scholarly debate continues to be heated, lengthy, and occasionally negative. Part of the reason why the democratic peace proposition has met so much opposition might lie in the threat it poses to many established theories of international relations. However, the empirical phenomenon of the democratic peace may be compatible with at least one established theory of international relations: power transition theory. If it can be shown that democracies evaluate the status quo similarly, then power transition theory predicts that wars between them should be exceedingly rare. Further, if non-democracies comprise the bulk of states dissatisfied with the status quo, then wars between democracies and non-democracies are to be expected. Regime type is tentatively linked to status quo evaluations in this article, suggesting that it may be possible to incorporate the empirical observation of a democratic peace within power transition theory. Rather than contradicting established theory, the results associated with the democratic peace might indicate how strong an influence the status quo plays in restraining international conflict.

Many studies highlight the role that international intervention can play in prolonging civil wars. Yet, direct military intervention is just one way that external actors become involved in civil conflicts. In this article, a model is developed and analyzed that shows that when the government is unsure about how external support to the rebels will help rebel war-making capacity, it is the government that will continue fighting rather than settle the dispute. Different types of external support to rebels influence their fighting capacity differently, and some types of support create uncertainty about how new resources will translate into war-making ability. Specifically, more fungible sources of support (such as direct financial support) generate the most uncertainty for states as they attempt to estimate the effect of support to rebels on the conflict. Increased uncertainty inhibits bargained settlement, and disputes characterized by fungible external support are less likely to end than those where rebels receive different kinds of support. Empirical analyses demonstrate strong support for this argument; rebels that receive highly fungible external support (money and guns) are less likely to see conflict termination than rebels that do not.