How Uncertainty about War Outcomes Affects War Onset

Abstract

In canonical accounts of war, conflict outcomes are inherently uncertain. Contesting literatures posit that this uncertainty, arising from stochastic elements of the war-fighting process, may induce conflict due to greater risks of miscalculation or foster peace by breeding caution. We theorize that states, on average, exhibit prudence when confronting greater uncertainty. Despite its conceptual importance, extant proxies for uncertainty at various levels of analysissuch as polarity, balance-of-power, system concentration, and dyadic relative capabilitiesare imprecise and theoretically inappropriate indicators. To overcome this shortcoming, we theorize the conditions that elevate the magnitude of uncertainty over conflict outcomes and introduce a novel measure that captures this uncertainty within any k-state system. Through extensive empirical analysis, we confirm uncertainty's pacifying effect, and show how this effect operates at different levels of analysis.

Bluff to peace: How economic dependence promotes peace despite increasing deception and uncertainty

“…In addition, this paper speaks to a broader literature of inter-state crisis bargaining. While the mainstream wisdom indicates that increasing uncertainty stokes conflict (Reed, 2003b; Slantchev, 2004), some studies have contended that uncertainty also rewards prudence (Bas and Schub, 2016) and may result in a more peaceful outcome depending on the source of uncertainty (Fey and Ramsay, 2011), whether there is ongoing concern over commitment problems (Wolford et al, 2011; Bas and Schub, 2017), and prior optimistic/pessimistic beliefs (Arena and Wolford, 2012). My study adds to the latter caution and shows that the mechanism of economic dependence can promote peace even when it renders states less certain of an opponent’s resolve.…”

External Intervention, Identity, and Civil War

“…These arguments about the likely impact of intervention on domestic con ‡ict have been developed mostly in the context of incomplete information environments and bargaining games. It has been shown that civil war can be prolonged as a result of uncertainty about the extent or likelihood of external intervention (Sawyer et al, 2015;Powell 2017); and that interventions that help establish power parity among domestic actors can make con ‡ict outbreaks more likely as they create uncertainty over the con…ct outcome (Bas and Schub 2016). The expectation of intervention on the side of rebels could escalate con ‡icts as rebel demands get progressively more expansive (Jenne 2004); by making the government take preemptive action (Poast 2015); or otherwise create bargaining failures (Grigoryan 2010, Cetinyan 2003.…”

“…Some studies also consider how the interveners’ preferences shape the preferences of local parties. See Amegashie (2014), Amegashie and Kutsoati (2007), Chang et al (2007), Sawyer et al (2015), Cetinyan (2002), Grigorian (2010), Bas and Schub (2016), Wagner (2007), Powell (2017), Kydd and Straus (2013), Jenne (2004), and Thyne (2006). A study more closely related to ours is Mylonas (2013), which considers how state policies toward minority groups are shaped by interstate competition; in his theory, ethnic minorities are less likely to be accommodated if they are supported by external patrons whose foreign policy interests are antithetical to the interests of the host state.…”

What the Enemy Knows: Common Knowledge and the Rationality of War

“…Blainey's often-cited argument, for example, is that 'wars usually begin when two nations disagree on their relative strength' (Blainey 1988, 246). Similarly, Fearon (1995, 18) focuses on 'disagreements about relative power and uncertainty about a 2 Some of the proxies for uncertainty rely on the military balance (Bas and Schub 2016a;Reed 2003;Slantchev 2004), while others are based on private capabilities such as secret alliances (Bas and Schub 2016b) or secret mobilization (Lai 2004).…”

“… 2 Some of the proxies for uncertainty rely on the military balance (Bas and Schub 2016a; Reed 2003; Slantchev 2004), while others are based on private capabilities such as secret alliances (Bas and Schub 2016b) or secret mobilization (Lai 2004). …”