Trade–conflict studies have shown that economic dependence can promote peace by costly signaling resolve. However, with higher economic integration, targets also become more vulnerable to coercion and potential challengers are incentivized to bluff. In return, target states may resist more, raising the question of whether trade still promotes peace. I theorize that bluffing does not stoke conflict in this context because the bargaining environment allows states to inform and coerce simultaneously: the factor that renders a threat less credible also restrains states from further escalation. I test this theory’s implications with a structural estimation method and find supporting results.
rèduise le déclenchement de conflits contre des partenaires commerciaux majeurs, elle rèduit ègalement la coopèration. Dans le même temps, une plus grande exposition à l'èconomie mondiale accroît la coopèration avec des partenaires commerciaux non-majeurs. Nous nous appuyons sur des donnèes portant sur des èvènements couvrant la pèriode 1995-2012 pour ètayer empiriquement nos hypothèses.
Studies of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have focused on the strategic intentions of Beijing, with much less attention paid to its political effects. The argument that the initiative can improve political relationships with BRI countries is assumed rather than empirically grounded. This paper bridges the gap by studying countries’ cooperation and conflict with China. I find that (a) the initiative appears to marginally improve BRI countries’ cooperation and significantly reduce low-intensity conflict; (b) the cooperation-promoting effect is driven only by neighboring countries while the restraining effect for low-intensity conflict results primarily from non-neighboring countries; and (c) there is no systematic evidence so far that the initiative has any effect on high-intensity conflict. These results offer mixed evidence of commercial liberalism in the context of the BRI: money (or the potential thereof) can induce cooperation in the short run, but it may not be enough to fundamentally change interstate relations.
Strong commercial ties promote peace as states shun the opportunity costs of economic disruption. However, trade also enriches and empowers states, rendering them more capable of enforcing long-term settlements. Given economic disruption does not last forever, countries can be incentivized to trade short-term economic losses for long-term political or territorial gains. This trade-off can restrict or even reverse the pacifying effect of commerce as it renders states incapable of committing to existing peaceful deals. I argue the scope condition hinges on the existing power imbalance and the security externalities of trade, defined as states’ abilities to translate trade gains into (potential) military power. For countries where the existing power gap is not extreme, the impact of bilateral strategic trade is contingent upon a country’s trade externality relative to its opponent’s. Although increased bilateral trade can be peace-promoting when the relative externality is small, the pacifying effects can dissipate as a relatively weaker state becomes more capable of exploiting trade gains. Building on recent work in network analysis, I propose a new measurement of trade externalities to test the above theory and find supporting results.
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