The region-cap allocation and delivery time decision in the marketplace mode under the cap-and-trade regulation

Xu, Xiaoping; Zhang, Mengying; Chen, Lai; Yu, Yugang

doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108407

Cited by 35 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…The authors of the article (Xu et al [ 8 ], Zhang et al [ 34 ]) in Section 2 claim that encroaching decisions with cap-and-trade regulation may always make the manufacturer better off. Nevertheless, the authors of the article (Ji et al [ 24 ], Xu et al [ 18 ], Yang et al [ 22 ]) believe that adding a new selling channel may not always benefit the manufacturer. Our research verified that when the government implements a cap-and-trade strategy, the encroaching decision does not always make the manufacturer better off.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Further, the authors of the article (Yu et al [ 25 ], Xu et al [ 8 ], Xu et al [ 18 ]) think that increasing the platform commission rate will not increase the platform profit. This paper investigates that the rising platform commission rate may cause the platform profit to increase first and then decrease.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This result is unique and different from other literature. Additionally, Xu et al [ 18 ] investigated the optimal manufacturer’s production and delivery time decisions and the government’s two different cap-and-trade regulation region cap setting decisions. Yu et al [ 25 ] reported how the government’s carbon emission regulation decisions between cap-and-trade and carbon tax regulation impact a manufacturer’s product decision, which sells its product through offline and online channels.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recently, seven carbon trading pilots have been established in China [ 18 ]. However, the cap-and-trade regulation policy currently aims at power enterprises with high carbon emissions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Manufacturer’s Encroachment and Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions Considering Cap-and-Trade Regulation and Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference

Ding

Jin

et al. 2022

IJERPH

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Carbon emission reduction and achieving carbon neutrality has become an inevitable trend in the sustainable development era. We investigate the manufacturer’s encroachment and carbon emission reduction decisions considering government cap-and-trade regulations and consumers’ low-carbon preference. The equilibrium decisions for the four scenarios are analytically obtained and compared based using the Stackelberg game. A comparison with and without cap-and-trade regulation under two encroachment decisions regarding member’s profits and carbon emission reduction levels are conducted. It is shown that the encroachment decision is always advantageous for the manufacturer if the government decides not to implement cap-and-trade regulation, and the retailer always loses profit. Moreover, if the carbon quota is sufficient, cap-and-trade regulation benefits the manufacturer. Otherwise, the manufacturer’s encroachment decision depends on the appropriate initial unit amount of carbon emission and unit carbon price. The retailer’s profit may not always be hurt by the manufacturer’s encroachment with cap-and-trade regulation; unless the unit carbon price exceeds a certain threshold, a higher consumer’s low-carbon preference in the encroachment scenario reduces more carbon emissions than in the no-encroachment scenario for the manufacturer. Further, the rising platform commission rate causes the platform profit to increase first and then decrease; the platform profit will slightly decrease if both products become more substitutes.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recently, seven carbon trading pilots have been established in China [ 18 ]. However, the cap-and-trade regulation policy currently aims at power enterprises with high carbon emissions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Manufacturer’s Encroachment and Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions Considering Cap-and-Trade Regulation and Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference

Ding

Jin

et al. 2022

IJERPH

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show abstract

“…In this mechanism, a cap is defined as the maximum carbon emission allowance for manufacturers, and is treated as the emission quota when producing the products and responding to the customer demands. Furthermore, companies can sell or buy carbon emission allowances from each other in a trading market (Xu, Zhang, Chen, & Yu, 2022). In this situation, companies alter their objective to profit maximization not only by manufacturing the proper amount of products, but also by buying or selling carbon emission allowances.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A robust optimization model for green supplier selection and order allocation in a closed-loop supply chain considering cap-and-trade mechanism

Mirzaee¹,

Samarghandi²,

Willoughby³

2022

Preprint

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Due to increasing air pollution, which is a consequence of the environmental effects of production in various industries, green supply chain management (GSCM) has attracted the attention of both scholars and practitioners. Green supplier selection is one of the most important problems in GSCM, which satisfies a firm's environmental goals as well as its economic targets. In this paper, for the first time, a green supplier

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Carbon allowance allocation rules under emission intensity regulation: Grandfathering versus benchmarking

Sun

Wang

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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This paper compares the impacts of grandfathering and benchmarking rules on firms' operating decisions, consumer surplus, and social welfare with different emission intensity limits. The findings suggest that with tight emission intensity limits, grandfathering rules are more effective in controlling carbon emissions and enhancing social welfare. Benchmarking rule with relaxed emission intensity can incentivize firms to increase output, lower product prices, and increase consumer surplus. Under relaxed intensity regulation, grandfathering rule can encourage more potential entrants to participate in the product market, and benchmarking rule can motivate firms to take more outputs, resulting higher consumer surplus and more carbon emissions.

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The region-cap allocation and delivery time decision in the marketplace mode under the cap-and-trade regulation

Cited by 35 publications

References 46 publications

Manufacturer’s Encroachment and Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions Considering Cap-and-Trade Regulation and Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference

Manufacturer’s Encroachment and Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions Considering Cap-and-Trade Regulation and Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference

A robust optimization model for green supplier selection and order allocation in a closed-loop supply chain considering cap-and-trade mechanism

Carbon allowance allocation rules under emission intensity regulation: Grandfathering versus benchmarking

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