The Razor Argument of Metaphysics A.9

Varela, José Edgar González

doi:10.1163/15685284-12341356

Phronesis

2018

DOI: 10.1163/15685284-12341356

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The Razor Argument of Metaphysics A.9

José Edgar González Varela

Abstract: I discuss Aristotle’s opening argument against Platonic Forms inMetaphysicsA.9, ‘the Razor’, which criticizes the introduction of Forms on the basis of an analogy with a hypothetical case of counting things. I argue for a new interpretation of this argument, and show that it involves two interesting objections against the introduction of Forms as formal causes: one concerns the completeness and the other the adequacy of such an explanatory project.

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2020

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Cited by 2 publications

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The Platonist Absurd Accumulation of Geometrical Objects: Metaphysics Μ.2

Varela

2020

Phronesis

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In the first argument of Metaphysics Μ.2 against the Platonist introduction of separate mathematical objects, Aristotle purports to show that positing separate geometrical objects to explain geometrical facts generates an ‘absurd accumulation’ of geometrical objects. Interpretations of the argument have varied widely. I distinguish between two types of interpretation, corrective and non-corrective interpretations. Here I defend a new, and more systematic, non-corrective interpretation that takes the argument as a serious and very interesting challenge to the Platonist.

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The Platonist Absurd Accumulation of Geometrical Objects: Metaphysics Μ.2

Varela

2020

Phronesis

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The One over Many Principle of Republic 596a

Varela

2020

Apeiron

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Republic 596a introduces a One over Many principle that has traditionally been considered as an argument for the existence of Forms, according to which, one Form should be posited for each like-named plurality. This interpretation was challenged by (Smith, J. A. 1917. “General Relative Clauses in Greek.” Classical Review 31: 69–71.), who interpreted it rather as a statement that each Form is unique and correlated to a plurality of things that have the same name as it. (Sedley, D. 2013. “Plato and the One-over-Many Principle”, in Chiaradonna & Galluzzo 2013, 113–37.) has offered a forceful defence of Smith’s interpretation. I argue that Sedley’s defence fails and that the traditional interpretation should be preferred.

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The Razor Argument of Metaphysics A.9

Cited by 2 publications

References 31 publications

The Platonist Absurd Accumulation of Geometrical Objects: Metaphysics Μ.2

The Platonist Absurd Accumulation of Geometrical Objects: Metaphysics Μ.2

The One over Many Principle of Republic 596a

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