The Ratings Game: Asymmetry in Classification

Abstract

Categorization processes are generally treated as consistent mappings of the underlying characteristics that they group. Yet, in many cases, the identities of actors influence these processes. When identity matters, high-status actors often obtain more favorable classifications. We examine these processes in the context of the Motion Picture Association of America's parental guidance classifications of movies (G, PG, R, NC-17). We find that, conditional on a given level of content, films distributed by the Association's members and those that involve more central producers and directors receive more lenient classifications than those carried by independent distributors and involving more peripheral personnel. Conversely, and again conditional on content, films involving directors with a history of producing R-rated features receive more restrictive ratings. We discuss the mechanisms that might account for these effects. Regardless of the mechanism, however, because ratings influence revenue and consequently profitability, the movie certification system in the United States places independent distributors and peripheral individuals at a disadvantage, relative to their larger and more central rivals.

Protecting Market Identity: When and How Do Organizations Respond to Consumers’ Devaluations?

“…In many cases, consumers and other stakeholders "rely on the evaluations of critics, experts, and certifying bodies (Hsu 2006) -for example, in determining whether to consider someone a legitimate medical practitioner or a bond a safe investment" (Waguespack & Sorenson, 2011: 542; see also Hannan et al, 2007). In many cases, consumers and other stakeholders "rely on the evaluations of critics, experts, and certifying bodies (Hsu 2006) -for example, in determining whether to consider someone a legitimate medical practitioner or a bond a safe investment" (Waguespack & Sorenson, 2011: 542; see also Hannan et al, 2007).…”

“…Furthermore, a focus on consumers requires attention to the ways in which organizations shape the perceptions of consumers through public responses, therefore expanding our understanding of the repertoire of actions available to organizations with a scarcity of resources for implementing significant organizational changes that are confronted with devaluations (see Espeland & Sauder, 2007;Martins, 2005;Zuckerman, 2000). By studying responses to consumer devaluations, we place organizations back into the evaluation game, acknowledging organizations an active role not only before but also after evaluations by intermediaries (Waguespack & Sorenson, 2011). Linguistic skills and competence are required to craft public responses that credibly counter a devaluation.…”

Quality, Subjectivity, and Sustained Superior Performance at the Olympic Games

“…For example, Kim and King (2014) demonstrate that high status baseball players are more likely to benefit from judgment calls made by umpires, nicely illustrating how quality can be inferred even when not precisely observed. Waguespack and Sorenson (2011) find that, holding film content constant, rating boards are more likely to deem movies from high status studios appropriate for younger audiences. The bias was even more pronounced in countries with industry-funded review boards, indicative of a situation in which accountability to the industry drives ratings.…”

“…Moreover, subjectivity is likely to evoke accountability concerns among judges. Reputations can therefore serve as a powerful decisionmaking guide (Correll et al 2012) and/or a crutch that helps evaluators justify decisions (Correll et al 2012, Jensen 2006, Waguespack and Sorenson 2011. The net result is that subjective performance judgments anchor on past winners, leading to systematic patterns of performance persistence.…”

Product Ratings as a Market Reaction to Deregulation: Evidence From the German Insurance Market

“…The empirical literature posits and confirms a variety of forces leading to upward bias in ratings when the rated company solicits and pays for the rating. These include increased market share (Hubbard, ), future cooperation or favor from rated companies (Lim, ; Waguespack and Sorenson, ), career concerns of individual raters (Hong and Kubick, ), and capture or collusion (Michaely and Womack, ). Moreover, increases in competition do not always improve rating accuracy (Becker and Milbourn, ).…”