The quest for legitimacy in independent Kosovo: the unfulfilled promise of diversity and minority rights

Abstract

When Kosovo declared its independence in 2008, it did so not as a nation-state, but as a “state of communities,” self-defining as multiethnic, diverse, and committed to extensive rights for minorities. In this paper, this choice is understood as a response to a dual legitimation problem. Kosovo experienced both an external legitimation challenge, regarding its contested statehood internationally, and an internal one, vis-à-vis its Serb minority. The focus on diversity and minority rights was expected to confer legitimacy on the state both externally and internally. International state-builders and the domestic political elite in post-conflict Kosovo both pursued this strategy. However, it inadvertently created an additional internal legitimation challenge, this time from within Kosovo's majority Albanian population. This dynamic is illustrated by the opposition movement “Lëvizja Vetëvendosje” (Self-Determination Movement), which rejects the framing of Kosovo as first and foremost a multiethnic state. The movement's counter-narrative represents an additional internal legitimation challenge to the new state. This paper thus finds that internationally endorsed “diversity management” through minority rights did not deliver as a panacea for the legitimacy dilemmas of the post-conflict polity. On the contrary, the “state of communities” continues to be contested by both majority and minority groups in Kosovo.

Everyday peace capture: Nationalism and the dynamics of peace after violent conflict

“…Intra‐ethnic and inter‐ethnic elite rivalries on nationalist grounds are detrimental to sustainable solutions to the conflict. As Stefan Wolff (: 14) argues, “political spaces exclusively defined in ethnic terms are static and inflexible, and often unable to cope with the complex political, social and economic dynamics of contemporary societies.” Multi‐ethnicity in Kosovo as prescribed by the liberal peace model has failed as a society‐building and conflict regulation strategy because it has entrenched ethnic tensions rather than transformed them (Landau, ). Such a change would require redesigning institutional and electoral systems in Kosovo, as well as promoting everyday reconciliation through acts of responsible citizenry, care, empathy, and place‐based association.…”

“…Multi-ethnicity in Kosovo as prescribed by the liberal peace model has failed as a society-building and conflict regulation strategy because it has entrenched ethnic tensions rather than transformed them (Landau, 2017). Such a change would require redesigning institutional and electoral systems in Kosovo, as well as promoting everyday reconciliation through acts of responsible citizenry, care, empathy, and place-based association.…”

“…The everyday institutional nationalism among ethnic Albanian elites (both pacifists and warlords) tried to shape the legal, political, and institutional environment for creating an independent statehood. Before independence, the tactic of ethnic Albanians was to promote the politics of cooperation and partnership with international missions, and through this pragmatic approach, they expanded their institutional powers and gradually put the factual conditions in place for claiming statehood (see Landau, ; Visoka, ). However, as the international community delayed defining Kosovo's political status, these Kosovo Albanian elites turned their strategy to obstructing multi‐ethnicity and minority integration, arguing that any conciliation on these points had to be conditional on Kosovo's independent statehood.…”

“…In the northern part of Kosovo, on a daily basis, the Serbian political elite refused to respect Kosovo's laws, demanded their by‐laws to be status‐neutral, and rejected Kosovo's state symbols, all of which sent negative signals for the prospects of political reconciliation among the main ethnic groups in Kosovo (Crisis Group, ). These everyday acts of institutional nationalism in turn have further antagonised Kosovo Albanians, thus reproducing nationalist discourses across all ethnic groups, which has negatively impacted the prospects for multi‐ethnic co‐existence in Kosovo (see Landau, ).…”

Playing with Fire: An Assessment of the EU’s Approach of Constructive Ambiguity on Kosovo’s Blended Conflict

“…98 Frustration is exacerbated by previous compromises Kosovars made on domestic laws and the rights of minorities, for example, the guaranteed seats minorities have in the Assembly and state institutions 99 and provisions that have been included in the internal legislation after demand of the international actors 100 and are considered by Kosovo Albanians to be overgenerous. 101 However, despite rhetoric of normalization of relations, Serbia seems reluctant to grant Kosovo official recognition and to open, thus, the way to uncontested statehood. Kosovars, therefore, are frustrated and concerned that they have been giving away elements of their sovereignty in vain.…”