The President and Congress

Binkley, Wilfred E.

doi:10.2307/2126499

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Sua jurisdição não era tão bem estabelecida de modo que o Presidente da Câmara não pudesse, em vez disso, indicar comissões seletas para lidar com questões que deveriam ter sido enviadas às comissões permanentes (cf. BINKLEY, 1949).…”

Section: O Crescimento Da Complexidade Internaunclassified

A institucionalização da câmara dos deputados dos Estados Unidos

Polsby

2008

Rev. Sociol. Polit.

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O artigo analisa como se deu a institucionalização da Câmara dos Deputados dos Estados Unidos, desde seu início, no final do século XVIII, até meados do século XX. Esse processo é analisado a partir de três variáveis fundamentais: 1) a delimitação funcional em relação a outras organizações, particularmente políticas; 2) a relativa complexidade da instituição, ou seja, até que ponto suas funções são internamente separadas em alguma base regular e explícita; 3) o universalismo e o automatismo nos procedimentos adotados para conduzir seus diversos assuntos internos. Cada uma dessas variáveis é sucessivamente examinada do ponto de vista histórico ao longo do artigo; a título de conclusão, apresentam-se algumas observações especulativas sobre causas, conseqüências e possíveis lições que se pode tirar da institucionalização da Câmara.

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Section: O Crescimento Da Complexidade Internaunclassified

A institucionalização da câmara dos deputados dos Estados Unidos

Polsby

2008

Rev. Sociol. Polit.

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“…And no research has considered the ubiquitous phenomenon of lame duck presidents dealing with congressional majorities so common to most of our history. For example, though contemporaneous with these amendments, Wilfred Binkley's (1949) oft-cited review of president-congressional relations makes no mention of either. 6 What research does consider these amendments attributes them to the Great Depression, Washington's two-term ''norm,'' or claims that the 22 nd constituted posthumous ''revenge'' on FDR (Kallenbach 1952; Willis and Willis 1952).…”

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confidence: 99%

Congressional Bargaining in Presidential Time: Give and Take, Anticipation, and the Constitutional Rationalization of Dead Ducks

Sullivan¹,

Marchi²

2011

The Journal of Politics

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This article introduces a simple theory of bargaining between presidents and members of Congress. Although it employs the analytics common to the typical ''sequenced'' theories, its approach places more emphasis on give and take, on less reliable information about intentions, and on more complex strategic considerations. The formal results highlight a presidential tenure effect, which in turn suggests four empirical expectations. The article then uses a unique empirical opportunity and data to assess and eventually validate expectations suggesting, in turn, that declining presidential tenure has a substantial effect on confidential bargaining, making coalition formation more erratic and costly. The article concludes with a theoretically informed discussion of how growing congressional seniority led to imposing the 20th and 22nd constitutional amendments.

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The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives

1968

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Most people who study politics are in general agreement, it seems to me, on at least two propositions. First, we agree that for a political system to be viable, for it to succeed in performing tasks of authoritative resource allocation, problem solving, conflict settlement, and so on, in behalf of a population of any substantial size, it must be institutionalized. That is to say, organizations must be created and sustained that are specialized to political activity.1 Otherwise, the political system is likely to be unstable, weak, and incapable of servicing the demands or protecting the interests of its constituent groups. Secondly, it is generally agreed that for a political system to be in some sense free and democratic, means must be found for institutionalizing representativeness with all the diversity that this implies, and for legitimizing yet at the same time containing political opposition within the system.2Our growing interest in both of these propositions, and in the problems to which they point, can begin to suggest the importance of studying one of the very few extant examples of a highly specialized political institution which over the long run has succeeded in representing a large number of diverse constituents, and in legitimizing, expressing, and containing political opposition within a complex political system—namely, the U.S. House of Representatives.The focus of my attention here will be first of all descriptive, drawing together disparate strands—some of which already exist in the literature3—in an attempt to show in what sense we may regard the House as an institutionalized organ of government. Not all the necessary work has been done on this rather difficult descriptive problem, as I shall indicate. Secondly, I shall offer a number of speculative observations about causes, consequences, and possible lessons to be draw from the institutionalization of the House.

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The President and Congress

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

A institucionalização da câmara dos deputados dos Estados Unidos

A institucionalização da câmara dos deputados dos Estados Unidos

Congressional Bargaining in Presidential Time: Give and Take, Anticipation, and the Constitutional Rationalization of Dead Ducks

The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives

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