Congressional Bargaining in Presidential Time: Give and Take, Anticipation, and the Constitutional Rationalization of Dead Ducks

Sullivan, Terry; Marchi, Scott de

doi:10.1017/s0022381611000430

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 40 publications

(35 reference statements)

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“…Our data allow scholars to examine, for example, whether a bill sponsor who brings a presidential initiative to fruition early in the president's term is more likely to be chosen as a sponsor for subsequent proposals. Additionally, our approach may allow a closer examination of relative attention to presidential initiatives when approaching a congressional midterm election than during a presidential election cycle or as a lame duck (e.g., Sullivan and de Marchi 2011).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unification of Powers: When Effective Lawmakers Sponsor Presidential Proposals in Congress

Volden

Kernell

Larocca

et al. 2021

Preprint

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While scholars have long noted presidential powers over congressional lawmaking arising through persuasion, veto bargaining, and public appeals, we argue that an important tool is missing from this list. Specifically, presidents who are strategic in their choices of early coalition partners in Congress – such as effective sponsors of administration bills – significantly enhance their chance of legislative success. We identify more than 1,400 executive branch proposals appearing as bills in Congress between 1989 and 2006. We examine which members of Congress sponsor these bills, finding strong evidence of disproportionate sponsorship by effective champions, such as majority-party members, committee and subcommittee chairs, lawmakers with proven effectiveness in the previous Congress, party leaders, and senior lawmakers, all else equal. Analyzing the fate of these proposals, we find that much of the success of the president’s agenda in Congress depends on these critical and strategic partnerships with effective congressional proponents.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unification of Powers: When Effective Lawmakers Sponsor Presidential Proposals in Congress

Volden

Kernell

Larocca

et al. 2021

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The electoral calendar has been found to affect the success of the president’s agenda (Alemán and Calvo, 2010; Barrett and Eshbaugh‐Soha 2007). When the end of the term is near, the government has less power to advance the president’s agenda (Canes‐Wrone and de Marchi 2002; Crockett 2008; Sullivan and de Marchi 2011), while governments are more successful during their honeymoons (Alemán and Navia 2009)—though the honeymoon effect might be conditioned by levels of public opinion polarization (Franklin and Fix 2016). Still, we would expect that the point in a president’s tenure—honeymoon, middle years, or last year—will impact the success of the president’s agenda.…”

Section: Determinants Of the Success Of The President’s Legislative A...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Changes in the Rules of the Lawmaking Process and the Success of Presidential Bills: Chile, 1990–2018

Mimica

Navia

Osorio

2022

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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this article assesses the effect of changes in the lawmaking process on the success of the president's legislative agenda, distinguishing between within-term success (bills that passed during the term) and overall success (including bills that passed after the president left office). With the 2064 presidential bills introduced in seven terms in Chile's presidential system, we assess the impact of changes in lawmaking rules on within-term (59.9%) and overall success (70.6%). Changes that decrease attributions of the president and create more opportunities for executive-legislative bargaining-including concurrent elections-increase the chances of success of presidential bills. the use of presidential urgency motions, an agenda-setting tool, makes bills more likely to pass, but the issuance of many urgency motions undermines the bill's chances to succeed. Presidential bills introduced early in the term and those on issues where there is more policy convergence are more likely to pass.as the devil is in the details, the success of the president's legislative agenda should be impacted by changes in the rules of the lawmaking process. in countries where legislative rules rarely change, differences in how presidents use their toolbox of legislative powers explain legislative success. thus, "differences in uncertainty, not partisan support, drive the variations in chief executives' ability to enact policy changes through statute law" (saiegh 2011, 11). in turn, in places where legislative rules change all the time, the effect of specific changes is difficult to isolate. But in countries with more stable institutional design and party system, seemingly minor changes in lawmaking rules might impact the success of the

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“…The electoral calendaror the point in the president's tenurehas also been found to affect the success of the president's agenda (Barrett and Eshbaugh-Soha 2007;Aleman and Calvo 2008). When a government nears the end of the term, it has weaker political power to advance the president's agenda (Lockerbie et al 1998;Canes-Wrone and de Marchi 2002;Barrett and Eshbaugh-Soha 2007;Sullivan and de Marchi 2011).…”

Section: Executive-legislative Paralysis and Its Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Wrong Poster Child for Legislative Paralysis: Salvador Allende and Legislative Output in Chile, 1932–1973

Navia

Osorio

2022

Soc. sci. hist.

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Conflicts resulting from the dual legitimacy problem of presidential systems (where the president and the legislature are elected by different majorities) sometimes result in legislative gridlock – a point made by those who criticize the alleged perils of presidentialism. The socialist government of Salvador Allende (1970–73), that ended with the breakdown of democracy, is often used as a poster child for legislative gridlock. With information on the 23,798 bills and 12,809 laws enacted in Chile between 1932 and 1973, we compare the passage of legislation in eight presidential terms and demonstrate that not to be the case. Legislative output showed an upward trend after the 1943 constitutional reform but was on a downward trend since the mid-1960s, before the 1970 constitutional reform restricted the scope of bills that legislators could introduce. Under Allende, while 1653 bills were introduced (438 of which were presidential bills), 642 laws were passed (38.8% and 68.2%, respectively) – compared to 53.8% and 39.9% for all presidents in the period, respectively. The evidence does not justify the claim that there was legislative gridlock under Allende. Instead, variations in legislative output across presidential terms in Chile can be explained by changes in the rules of the legislative process.

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Congressional Bargaining in Presidential Time: Give and Take, Anticipation, and the Constitutional Rationalization of Dead Ducks

Cited by 7 publications

References 40 publications

Unification of Powers: When Effective Lawmakers Sponsor Presidential Proposals in Congress

Unification of Powers: When Effective Lawmakers Sponsor Presidential Proposals in Congress

Changes in the Rules of the Lawmaking Process and the Success of Presidential Bills: Chile, 1990–2018

The Wrong Poster Child for Legislative Paralysis: Salvador Allende and Legislative Output in Chile, 1932–1973

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