The Prenective View of propositional content

Trueman, Robert

doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1309-4

Cited by 14 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Here then, this position agrees with Trueman (2018), who claims that propositions do not themselves have propositional content. However, Trueman (ibid., p. 1818) also endorses the claim, discussed above, that propositions 'are not the sort of things that can be true or false'.…”

Section: Truth-value Bearerssupporting

confidence: 82%

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Propositions are not representational

Brown

2021

Synthese

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It is often presumed by those who use propositions in their theories that propositions are representational; that is, that propositions represent the world as being some way. This paper makes two claims against this presumption. First, it argues that it does not follow from the fact that propositions play the theoretical roles usually attributed to them that they are representational. This conclusion is reached by rebutting three arguments that can be made in support of the claim that propositions are representational. This paper then advances the further claim that propositions are not representational. It considers several ways to overcome the difficulties traditionally associated with this claim, particularly how to account for falsity.

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Section: Truth-value Bearerssupporting

confidence: 82%

“…6 Pickel (2019, p. 1432 n. 12) makes a concession towards identity theory but leaves the relation between it and his own proposal unexplored. Trueman (2018Trueman ( , p. 1819, however, does make space for a kind identity theory of truth within his own 'Prenective view' of propositions.…”

Section: Truth-value Bearersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Propositions are not representational

Brown

2021

Synthese

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“…In this spirit, higher-order resources have recently been brought to bear on a diverse list of topics, including unrestricted quantification (Williamson 2003), essence (Correia 2006), the internalism versus externalism debate (Besson 2009), the contingentism versus necessitism debate (Stalnaker 2012;Williamson 2013;Fritz and Goodman 2017), generalized identity (Rayo 2013;Dorr 2016), propositions (Trueman 2018(Trueman , 2020Jones 2019) and grounding (Correia and Skiles 2019).…”

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confidence: 99%

Higher-order metaphysics and the tropes versus universals dispute

Skiba

2020

Philos Stud

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Higher-order realists about properties express their view that there are properties with the help of higher-order rather than first-order quantifiers. They claim two types of advantages for this way of formulating property realism. First, certain gridlocked debates about the nature of properties, such as the immanentism versus transcendentalism dispute, are taken to be dissolved (roughly: avoided). Second, a further such debate, the tropes versus universals dispute, is taken to be resolved (roughly: decided). In this paper I first argue that higher-order realism does not in fact resolve the tropes versus universals dispute. In a constructive spirit, I then develop higher-order realism in a way that leads to a dissolution, rather than a resolution, of this dispute too.

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“…In notation, the cross type relation of belief is: λx, p. ∃y(y is a proposition ∧ Bel(x, y) ∧ ∀z(PR(z, p) ↔ z = y))13 SeeTrueman (2018) for related argument.…”

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confidence: 99%

VIII—Propositions and Cognitive Relations

Jones

2019

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

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There are two broad approaches to theorizing about ontological categories. Quineans use first-order quantifiers to generalize over entities of each category, whereas type theorists use quantification on variables of different semantic types to generalize over different categories. Does anything of import turn on the difference between these approaches? If so, are there good reasons to go type-theoretic? I argue for positive answers to both questions concerning the category of propositions. I also discuss two prominent arguments for a Quinean conception of propositions, concerning their role in natural language semantics and apparent quantification over propositions within natural language. It will emerge that even if these arguments are sound, there need be no deep question about Quinean propositions’ true nature, contrary to much recent work on the metaphysics of propositions.

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The Prenective View of propositional content

Abstract: Beliefs have what I will call 'propositional content'. A belief is always a belief that so-and-

Cited by 14 publications

References 18 publications

Propositions are not representational

Propositions are not representational

Higher-order metaphysics and the tropes versus universals dispute

VIII—Propositions and Cognitive Relations

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