VIII—Propositions and Cognitive Relations

Abstract

There are two broad approaches to theorizing about ontological categories. Quineans use first-order quantifiers to generalize over entities of each category, whereas type theorists use quantification on variables of different semantic types to generalize over different categories. Does anything of import turn on the difference between these approaches? If so, are there good reasons to go type-theoretic? I argue for positive answers to both questions concerning the category of propositions. I also discuss two prominent arguments for a Quinean conception of propositions, concerning their role in natural language semantics and apparent quantification over propositions within natural language. It will emerge that even if these arguments are sound, there need be no deep question about Quinean propositions’ true nature, contrary to much recent work on the metaphysics of propositions.

Higher‐order metaphysics

“…So, from the perspective of higher‐orderists, the question cannot even be intelligibly formulated, which absolves them of any obligation to even engage with it (see Jones, 2018). Further questions to be eschewed in this way include the question of whether higher‐order entities are sets (Jones, 2019, p. 172), once more the question whether properties are tropes or universals (which Skiba, 2020 marks out for dissolution, rather than resolution), and the question whether properties need to be connected to objects by an instantiation relation, a question which famously serves as the starting point for Bradley's Regress (Trueman, 2021, Ch. 10, §2).…”

“…Those higher‐orderists about propositions who follow, in varying degrees of proximity, the Priorian suggestion (Jones, 2019; Rosefeldt, 2008; Trueman, 2018, 2020, 2021) have claimed two advantages over the first‐order conception.…”

Presentism and times as propositions

“…Rather, our interest is in exploring the consequences of a different approach to higher-order quantification: one that takes higher-order quantification as metaphysically fundamental, and therefore irreducible. Call the former thesis Higher-Order Primitivism, or 'HOP' for short: HIGHER-ORDER PRIMITIVISM (HOP): Higher-order quantification is fundamental HOP has been defended by (among others) Bostock ( 2004); Jones (2018Jones ( , 2019; Prior (1971, chapter 2); Rayo and Yablo (2001); and Williamson (2003Williamson ( , 2013. For instance, Jones (2019, 12) expresses a commitment to the view that propositions are irreducibly higher-order entities ('entities of type t'):…”

Propositions are not representational

“…Jones (2019) is a more recent example of a theory of propositions which holds a notably direct connection between the world and, what I have been calling, representational attitudes. Jones rejects the view that the contents of these attitudes are objects and, to that end, rejects the metaphysical questions about their nature that I am considering here.8 Russell (1904, p. 523) initially put the problem another way: 'it seems to remain that, when a proposition is false, something does not subsist which would subsist if the proposition were true'.…”