Propositions are not representational

Brown, Thomas

doi:10.1007/s11229-020-03014-2

Cited by 14 publications

References 25 publications

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Truth is One (No Need for Pluralism)

Volpe

2023

Erkenn

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In this paper, I discuss the currently most popular argument for alethic pluralism, maintaining that the so-called scope problem provides no compelling reason for abandoning the traditional view that truth is one and the same (substantive) property across the various regions of thought or discourse in which it is ascribed or denied to the things we think or say. I disarm the argument by showing that the scope problem does not arise for a number of non-deflationary, monistic views of truth that meet certain semantic and metaphysical constraints, for one can accept any of these views and provide a plausible account of the fact that mental and linguistic tokenings belonging to different regions of discourse involve radically different ways of engaging with reality ? from detecting pre-existing facts to constituting them.

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Truth is One (No Need for Pluralism)

Volpe

2023

Erkenn

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Does the no miracles argument apply to AI?

Rowbottom,

Peden,

Curtis-Trudel

2024

Synthese

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According to the standard no miracles argument, science’s predictive success is best explained by the approximate truth of its theories. In contemporary science, however, machine learning systems, such as AlphaFold2, are also remarkably predictively successful. Thus, we might ask what best explains such successes. Might these AIs accurately represent critical aspects of their targets in the world? And if so, does a variant of the no miracles argument apply to these AIs? We argue for an affirmative answer to these questions. We conclude that if the standard no miracles argument is sound, an AI-specific no miracles argument is also sound.

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Truth Without Truths

Liggins

2024

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The purpose of this book is to bring nihilism into debates over truth and paradox, and show that a nihilist approach to truth is a serious contender. In the philosophy of mathematics, Field denies the existence of mathematical objects, and in metaethics Mackie denies the existence of morally obligatory actions. These nihilist positions are promising and have led to rich debates. In the study of truth, nihilism is the view that nothing is true. This is a very striking and (at first) implausible thesis, which is perhaps why it is seldom discussed. This book demonstrates that in fact a surprisingly strong case is available for nihilism about truth. The main grounds for taking the view seriously are the elegant solutions it provides to a wide range of paradoxes involving truth, and its epistemological superiority to theories that posit truths. The discussion considers a wider range of paradoxes than usual—including the Truth-teller paradox and other paradoxes of underdetermination. This book is also a challenge to deflationism. All contemporary deflationists posit truths. By showing that we can well do without truths, Liggins argues that deflationism is actually too lavish a position. Liggins’s preferred form of alethic nihilism includes a Ramseyan analysis of the concept of truth, which uses quantification into sentence position, conceived of as non-objectual and non-substitutional. So this book is part of a wider movement exploring the implications of admitting forms of non-objectual, non-substitutional quantification—sometimes called ‘higher-order metaphysics’.

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Propositions are not representational

Cited by 14 publications

References 25 publications

Truth is One (No Need for Pluralism)

Truth is One (No Need for Pluralism)

Does the no miracles argument apply to AI?

Truth Without Truths

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