Truth Without Truths

Abstract

The purpose of this book is to bring nihilism into debates over truth and paradox, and show that a nihilist approach to truth is a serious contender. In the philosophy of mathematics, Field denies the existence of mathematical objects, and in metaethics Mackie denies the existence of morally obligatory actions. These nihilist positions are promising and have led to rich debates. In the study of truth, nihilism is the view that nothing is true. This is a very striking and (at first) implausible thesis, which is perhaps why it is seldom discussed. This book demonstrates that in fact a surprisingly strong case is available for nihilism about truth. The main grounds for taking the view seriously are the elegant solutions it provides to a wide range of paradoxes involving truth, and its epistemological superiority to theories that posit truths. The discussion considers a wider range of paradoxes than usual—including the Truth-teller paradox and other paradoxes of underdetermination. This book is also a challenge to deflationism. All contemporary deflationists posit truths. By showing that we can well do without truths, Liggins argues that deflationism is actually too lavish a position. Liggins’s preferred form of alethic nihilism includes a Ramseyan analysis of the concept of truth, which uses quantification into sentence position, conceived of as non-objectual and non-substitutional. So this book is part of a wider movement exploring the implications of admitting forms of non-objectual, non-substitutional quantification—sometimes called ‘higher-order metaphysics’.