The Politics of Reforming Social Security

Abstract

What are the chances that Congress and the president will tackle the social security problem and enact reforms within the next several years? Does it seem more likely that they would adopt a comprehensive new system for retirement security or that they would approve more modest adjustments to the current system, returning the program to actuarial balance without altering its fundamental character? Are some kinds of reforms more politically attractive than others? These are important questions that deserve careful answers. This article addresses these questions within a general discussion of the political feasibility of alternative schemes for reforming Social Security. Policy analysts often avoid questions of political feasibility, preferring to design programs that they believe will best achieve certain ends, while leaving it to politicians to "do the right thing." Sometimes this works nicely, and elected politicians enact analysts' handiwork. Quite frequently, however, the absence of early political analysis leads to unhappy outcomes. Sometimes Congress rejects not only the proposed policy but the notion of doing anything at all. Some would argue that this is what happened with President Bill Clinton's healthcare package. A comprehensive plan designed by policy specialists without proper attention to political feasibility drove health-care reform off the governmental agenda. A second possibility is that Congress may start with policy analysts' most-preferred policy but quickly transform it into something that is unrecognizable to its early advocates and unlikely to achieve their intended purpose. The 89th Congress did this with President Lyndon Johnson's proposal to concentrate large sums of money in a few Model Cities by insisting that smaller sums be dispersed among 150 cities. 1 A third possibility is that Congress

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“…Systematic and continuous political analysis of stakeholders can help decision makers and high-level implementers improve the chances for successful policy design and implementation. 1,44 It is important to recognize that some challenges in implementation may be the result of poorly designed health policy, intentionally or unintentionally. For example, during elections, politicians may knowingly announce ambitious health policies that are not financially or administratively feasible (in the short or medium term).…”

Elephants on the move. Patterns of public pension reform in OECD countries

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Bancada Sindical, Política Previdenciária E Processo Decisório No Governo Dilma

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“…Embora não possuam poder de veto institucional, os sindicalistas podem legitimar as propostas de reforma dos sistemas previdenciários (Jard da Belánd, 2001). Portanto, ainda que ao longo das últimas décadas as entidades sindicais tenham perdido poder de arregimentação de afiliados (Estanque, Costa e Silva, 2015;Ferreira, 2002;Martins Rodrigues 1999;1998), elas podem desempenhar um papel importante no debate das mudanças das políticas públicas. 13 No Brasil, diversos autores têm chamado a atenção para a participação sindical no processo de formulação de políticas públicas.…”