The ontological commitments of inconsistent theories

Colyvan, Mark

doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9266-5

Cited by 45 publications

(19 citation statements)

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“…Colyvan reconoce que la proliferación de contradicciones en la ciencia madura, lejos de abonar la adopción de un realismo de entidades inconsistentes, puede sumirnos en el pesimismo meta-inductivo de raigambre anti-realista (cf. COLYVAN, 2008a). Una salida plausible frente a este escollo reside en descartar las teorías científicas inconsistentes, aduciendo que el mundo empírico es consistente o que, en todo caso, no hay motivos fundados para sospechar que no lo sea 2 .…”

Section: Guiradounclassified

<b>Realismo científico y entidades inconsistentes. Críticas a la metafísica de Colyvan

Guirado

2015

Acta Sci. Human Soc. Sci.

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RESUMEN. Según Mark Colyvan, algunos desarrollos científicos maduros (en particular: la cosmología newtoniana, la oceanografía descriptiva, el cálculo temprano y la teoría cuántica de Dirac) contienen presupuestos contradictorios, los cuales habilitan prima facie la adopción de un realismo naturalizado de entidades inconsistentes. Un aspecto exótico del planteo de Colyvan es la pretensión de que el realismo en cuestión emana de la aplicación de los parámetros de evaluación de teorías involucrados en la epistemología de Quine. Si bien esta pretensión es altamente controversial, no será analizada en el presente trabajo. Mi intención es, simplemente, mostrar que las teorías comprometidas en el análisis de Colyvan no exhiben las propiedades requeridas para promover una metafísica de entidades contradictorias filosóficamente respetable. Las tesis que defiendo al respecto son: (i) que la cosmología newtoniana y la oceanografía descriptiva no envuelven elementos genuinamente inconsistentes y (ii) que las inconsistencias presentes en el cálculo temprano y la teoría cuántica de Dirac respectivamente manifiestan una eficacia metodológica lo suficientemente endeble como para que su empleo no demande racionalmente una cobertura realista.Palabras-clave: realismo científico, entidades inconsistentes, Quine, metodología de la ciencia, Mark Colyvan. Scientific realism and inconsistencies. Critique to Colyvan's metaphysicsABSTRACT. According to Mark Colyvan, certain mature scientific developments (specifically, Newtonian cosmology, descriptive oceanography, early calculus and Dirac's quantum theory) contain contradictory assumptions, and this enables the prima facie adoption of certain naturalized realism of inconsistent entities. An exotic aspect of Colyvan's proposal is the claim that the resulting variety of realism emerges from the mere application of the parameters of theory evaluation involved in Quine's epistemology. While this is a highly controversial claim in itself, it will not be analyzed in this paper. My intention is to show that the theories put forward by Colyvan do not exhibit the properties required to promote a philosophically respectable metaphysics of contradictory entities. The theses defended are: (i) neither Newtonian cosmology nor descriptive oceanography exhibits any genuine contradiction; (ii) the apparent inconsistencies in early calculus and Dirac's quantum theory respectively exhibit a weak enough methodological effectivity so that their use do not rationally demand a realistic recovery.Keywords: scientific realism, inconsistent entities, Quine, scientific methodology, Mark Colyvan. IntroducciónMark Colyvan se propuso en trabajos relativamente recientes esbozar un realismo de entidades inconsistentes sustentado en la filosofía de la ciencia de Quine (COLYVAN, 2008a, b;2009). El enfoque quineano exige traducir las oraciones de una teoría al lenguaje de la lógica cuantificacional elemental para revelar sus compromisos ontológicos. Estos compromisos se harán manifiestos al determinar el dominio de enti...

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Section: Guiradounclassified

<b>Realismo científico y entidades inconsistentes. Críticas a la metafísica de Colyvan

Guirado

2015

Acta Sci. Human Soc. Sci.

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“…Colyvan has prominently argued for the indispensability of mathematical objects (Colyvan, 2001). He has gone on to explicitly align his later argument for inconsistent theories and objects with the indispensability argument for mathematical objects.…”

Section: Indispensability and Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…He has gone on to explicitly align his later argument for inconsistent theories and objects with the indispensability argument for mathematical objects. Colyvan (2008a) argues that inconsistent theories and inconsistent objects are indispensable so that we ought to take on commitments to such theories and objects:…”

Section: Indispensability and Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Facing Inconsistency: Theories and Our Relations to Them

Michael¹

2013

Episteme

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Classical logic is explosive in the face of contradiction, yet we nd ourselves using inconsistent theories. Mark Colyvan, one of the prominent advocates of the indispensability argument for realism about mathematical objects, suggests that such use can be garnered to develop an argument for commitment to inconsistent objects and, because of that, a paraconsistent underlying logic. I argue to the contrary that it is open to a classical logician to make distinctions, also needed by the paraconsistent logician, which allow a more nuanced ranking of theories in which inconsistent theories can have different degrees of usefulness and productivity. Facing inconsistency does not force us to adopt an underlying paraconsistent logic. Moreover we will see that the argument to best explanation deployed by Colyvan in this context is unsuccessful. I suggest that Quinean approach which Colyvan champions will not lead to the revolutionary doctrines Colyvan endorses.

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“…The relevant notion cannot be one that prohibits belief in the truth of inconsistent theories or sentences. To see why not consider the following example from Mark Colyvan (2007). 18th century calculus is inconsistent, as it assumes that the value of a particular constant h is zero and non-zero in one and the same calculation.…”

Section: The Notion Of Ontological Commitmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inscrutability and ontological commitment

Brogaard

2008

Philos Stud

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There are two doctrines for which Quine is particularly well known: the doctrine of ontological commitment and the inscrutability thesis-the thesis that reference and quantification are inscrutable. At first glance, the two doctrines are squarely at odds. If there is no fact of the matter as to what our expressions refer to, then it would appear that no determinate commitments can be read off of our best theories. We argue here that the appearance of a clash between the two doctrines is illusory. The reason that there is no real conflict is not simply that in determining our theories' ontological commitments we naturally rely on our home language but also (and more importantly) that ontological commitment is not intimately tied to objectual quantification and a reference-first approach to language. Or so we will argue. We conclude with a new inscrutability argument which rests on the observation that the notion of objectual quantification, when properly cashed out, deflates.

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The ontological commitments of inconsistent theories

Cited by 45 publications

References 19 publications

<b>Realismo científico y entidades inconsistentes. Críticas a la metafísica de Colyvan

<b>Realismo científico y entidades inconsistentes. Críticas a la metafísica de Colyvan

Facing Inconsistency: Theories and Our Relations to Them

Inscrutability and ontological commitment

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