Facing Inconsistency: Theories and Our Relations to Them

Michael, Michaelis

doi:10.1017/epi.2013.31

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…In some formulations of RAA we need double negation elimination as well. 9 See for more on this Michael (2013). tent logic.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On a “most telling” argument for paraconsistent logic

Michael

2015

Synthese

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Priest and others have presented their "most telling" argument for paraconsistent logic: that only paraconsistent logics allow non-trivial inconsistent theories. This is a very prevalent argument; occurring as it does in the work of many relevant and more generally paraconsistent logicians. However this argument can be shown to be unsuccessful. There is a crucial ambiguity in the notion of non-triviality. Disambiguated the most telling reason for paraconsistent logics is either question-begging or mistaken. This highlights an important confusion about the role of logic in our development of our theories of the world. Does logic chart good reasoning or our commitments? We also consider another abductive argument for paraconsistent logics which also is shown to fail.

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“…In some formulations of RAA we need double negation elimination as well. 9 See for more on this Michael (2013). tent logic.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For further discussion of the uses of inconsistent theories with a classical underlying logic seeMichael (2013).…”

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confidence: 99%

On a “most telling” argument for paraconsistent logic

Michael

2015

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In Pursuit of the Non-Trivial

Caret

2019

Episteme

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This paper is about the underlying logical principles of scientific theories. In particular, it concerns ex contradictione quodlibet (ECQ) the principle that anything follows from a contradiction. ECQ is valid according to classical logic, but invalid according to paraconsistent logics. Some advocates of paraconsistency claim that there are ‘real’ inconsistent theories that do not erupt with completely indiscriminate, absurd commitments. They take this as evidence in favor of paraconsistency. Michael (2016) calls this the non-triviality strategy (NTS). He argues that this strategy fails in its purpose. I will show that Michael's criticism significantly over-reaches. The fundamental problem is that he places more of a burden on the advocate of paraconsistency than on the advocate of classical logic. The weaknesses in Michael's argument are symptomatic of this preferential treatment of one viewpoint in the debate over another. He does, however, make important observations that allow us to clarify some of the complexities involved in giving a logical reconstruction of a theory. I will argue that there are abductive arguments deserving of further consideration for the claim that paraconsistent logic offers the best explanation of the practice of inconsistent science. In this sense, the debate is still very much open.

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Information and Veridicality: Information Processing and the Bar-Hillel/Carnap Paradox

Fresco¹,

Michael

2016

Philos. of Sci.

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Floridi’s Theory of Strongly Semantic Information posits the Veridicality Thesis (i.e., information is true). One motivation is that it can serve as a foundation for information-based epistemology being an alternative to the tripartite theory of knowledge. However, the Veridicality thesis is false, if ‘information’ is to play an explanatory role in human cognition. Another motivation is avoiding the so-called Bar-Hillel/Carnap paradox (i.e., any contradiction is maximally informative). But this paradox only seems paradoxical, if (a) ‘information’ and ‘informativeness’ are synonymous, (b) logic is a theory of inference, or (c) validity suffices for rational inference; a, b, and c are false.

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Facing Inconsistency: Theories and Our Relations to Them

Cited by 3 publications

References 29 publications

On a “most telling” argument for paraconsistent logic

On a “most telling” argument for paraconsistent logic

In Pursuit of the Non-Trivial

Information and Veridicality: Information Processing and the Bar-Hillel/Carnap Paradox

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